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The subject of this symposium is consent decrees, and I have
been asked to think about judges and consent decrees. I have be-
gun to wonder about the very act of a judge entering a consent
decree. What is the meaning, for the court, the parties, and the
public, of judicial endorsement of parties' agreements? What do we
understand that a judge does when she or he transforms an agree-
ment of the parties into a court decree?
To explore these questions, I describe the forms of judicial in-
volvement in the consent decree process; I identify the various
roles created by custom, rule or statute for judges in formulating,
approving, entering, and enforcing consent decrees. Thereafter, I
examine the possible reasons for providing consent decrees, and I
explore whether and what kind of judicial involvement in the con-
sent decree process is appropriate. My primary interest is in the
role of federal judges during the negotiation and entry phases of
the consent decree process. Other commentators in this symposium
will address questions of implementation, enforcement, and modi-
fication of decrees.
The examination of the judicial role during the negotiation
and entry of consent decrees reveals a problematic, tension-ridden,
and vague conception of that role. When entering a consent decree,
a person (bearing the title "judge") declines to adjudicate but
nonetheless files-and sometimes blesses-parties' agreements,
thus giving them a special status. Judging consent is a difficult
and, in some instances, impossible task. As a consequence, I have
some skepticism about reliance upon judicial role to validate the
practice of providing consent decrees. However, my concerns about
the role of the judge do not decide the ultimate issue of the propri-
ety or utility of having consent decrees as an option when conclud-
ing some or all kinds of cases. Other commentators-in this sym-
posium1 and elsewhere 2-have made claims for consent decrees.
What I offer is analysis of whether judicial involvement with con-
sent decrees can be the source of their legitimacy.
' Burt Neuborne and Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., A Prelude to The Settlement of
Wilder, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 177; Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent
Judgments, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 19; Robert V. Percival, The Bounds of Consent: Consent
Decrees, Settlements and Federal Environmental Policy making, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 327.
But see Owen M. Fiss, Justice Chicago Style, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 1.
I Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950, 956-59 (1979).
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I. MAPPING THE LANDSCAPE
A. The Terminology
I will use the terms "consent decrees" and "consent judg-
ments" to denominate agreements that parties have consented to
and that a judge has entered (typically by writing "so ordered" and
by signing her or his name) as an order of the court. Although "de-
crees" formerly described only those orders issued from courts of
equity while "judgments" were those orders rendered by courts of
law,3 the merger of equity and law has blurred this distinction. 4
My use of the terms consent decree and consent judgment there-
fore includes instances when parties have agreed upon monetary
payments as well as when parties have agreed to structure their
interactions without money changing hands.
I am interested in judicial behavior vis-a-vis these agreements
in both civil and criminal contexts; plea bargains are, of course,
consent decrees by another name. In addition to consent decrees
and plea bargains, terms to describe these agreements vary; some
jurisdictions call such agreements "consent judgments," while in
other places, "stipulated judgments" or simply "settlements" are
the words used.5 "Settlements," however, comprise a larger species;
I See Robert Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical Perspective 356
(1952). According to one nineteenth century treatise writer, "a decree differs from a judg-
ment both in the process which precedes and determines it and in its contents .... [In
addition to the differences between courts of law and equity,] a judgment at law is usu-
ally .... in contested cases, determined by the verdict .... [whereas] a judge in equity is
called upon to decide upon the whole merits of the controversy .... Hence while a decree is,
equally, with a judgment, the deliverance of the law it is also ... the decision of the man
who frames it .... Henry Black, A Treatise on the Law of Judgments 3-4 (1891) (emphasis
in the original). But, as Black noted, the "distinction between decrees and judgments has
not always been strictly preserved in American practice." Id. at 4.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have adopted the term "judgments" as the ge-
neric. See Fed. Rules Civil Proc. 54 and 58. The Second Circuit has recently attempted to
distinguish between a "true 'consent judgment'" (in which "all of the relief to be provided
by the judgment and all of the wording to effectuate that relief is agreed to by the parties")
and a "settlement judgment" (in which "the parties have agreed on the components of the
judgment . . . but -have not agreed on all the details or the wording of the judgment
[and] . .. the judge is obliged to determine the detailed terms of the relief and the word-
ing .... ." Janus Films, Inc. v. Miller, 801 F.2d 578, 582 (2d Cir. 1986).
1 California terms them "settlement agreements." See Corkland v. Boscoe, 156 Cal.
App. 3d. 989, 203 Cal. Rptr. 356 (1st Dist. 1984). Dick Craswell tells me that the Federal
Trade Commission called them "consent orders." For a discussion of agency rule making by
"consensus," see Douglas H. Ginsburg, Regulation of Broadcasting: The Regulated Emer-
gence of Cable 343-89 (1979) (quoting, inter alia, Commissioner Nicholas Johnson's state-
ment: "In future years, when students of law ... wish to study the decision-making process
at its worst, when they look for examples of industry domination of government. . . ,they
will look to the [Federal Communications Commission's] handling of the never-ending saga
of cable television ... ").
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not all settlements of cases result in consent decrees. Often, when
parties agree to terminate lawsuits, they file "notices of dismis-
sal.' 6 Such notices simply request that the court record that cases
have been dismissed by stipulation of the parties. Currently, fed-
eral court statistical data do not indicate how many notices of dis-
missal are prompted by plaintiffs who decide to withdraw cases
without obtaining any relief, and how many dismissals are the
functional equivalents (in many respects) of "consent judg-
ments"-agreements negotiated by the parties and requiring spe-
cific remedial action, but lacking court endorsement.7 We do know
that some 269,848 dispositions occurred in federal court in 1985; of
these, 15,661 were "consent judgments" while 127,919 were "dis-
missals" that include but are not limited to dismissals predicated
upon consent.'
A critical distinction-and one of import here-between a no-
tice of dismissal (based upon a contractual agreement) and a con-
' Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 41. Compare Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 48(a) (dismissals in criminal
cases may not occur without "leave of court") and Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 23(e) (a class action
cannot be "dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court").
7 Federal court clerks compile data in each federal district court on each federal case.
Dispositions of cases are coded pursuant to instructions from the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, which has provided ten subcategories including one decribed as
"dismissed, discontinued, settled, withdrawn, etc." and another described as "judgment on
consent." The current categories do not capture the distinctions between (for example) no-
tices of dismissal based upon consent and notices of dismissal based upon a plaintiff's deci-
sion not to pursue a case. My understanding of the available data has been greatly advanced
by conversations with Terry Dungworth, who, in conjunction with the Federal Judicial
Center, is working on the preparation of a public-use Federal Court Data Base and who
provided me with information from the Rand Corporation's version of this data base (Rand
Federal Court Data Base) (excerpts on file with the University of Chicago Legal Forum and
with the author). According to a staff member of the Administrative Office, pilot projects
are under way to revise the coding of dispositions so as to distinguish among dismissals for
"no prosecution," dismissals for want of jurisdiction, "voluntary" dismissals, dismissals
based upon "settlement," and others. Conversation of September 25, 1986. One difficulty in
data collection is that typical notices of dismissal do not describe what prompted the
dismissal.
Given the predominance of settlement as a disposition mode, learning the forms the
parties choose would be helpful in terms of understanding more about the parties' assump-
tions and the use of consent decrees. For example, does use of consent decrees vary by
region or state? By the nature of the claim? By the relief provided? For one effort to ascer-
tain some data, see Richard A. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.
L. & Econ. 365, 381-83 (1970). For a review of the empirical work done on shareholder
derivative actions (which also require judicial approval prior to their dismissal or compro-
mise), see Bryant G. Garth, Ilene H. Nagel, and Sheldon J. Plager, Empirical Research and
the Shareholder Derivative Suit: Toward A Better-Informed Debate, 48 L. & Contemp.
Probs. 137 (Summer 1985).
8 Rand Federal Court Data Base (cited in note 7).
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sent decree is that, if the agreement between the parties subse-
quently sours, the litigants who have a dismissal may enforce their
"private contract" (a term that appears with some frequency in the
case law and commentary) by filing a new lawsuit, based upon that
contract. In contrast, those litigants who have terminated their
lawsuit by a consent decree have a contract that is something more
(how much more is not clear) than a "private contract." A judge
has signed the contract, and that contract can be enforced as a
continuation of the original lawsuit and, in other jurisdictions, as a
judgment. The dissatisfied party may seek compliance and, ulti-
mately,' contempt. Hence, the questions for this paper. What do
judges actually do when signing such contracts? What does the law
understand judges to be doing by signing such contracts? Do we
want judges to sign such contracts?
B. The Typology
Three phases of litigation-negotiation, entry, and compli-
ance-are part of the consent decree process. Consent decrees
come into being because of the existence of a dispute that has been
negotiated to conclusion. That negotiation may conclude at one of
three points: either (a) a lawsuit is filed and the parties reach an
agreement prior to adjudication of contested issues; (b) a lawsuit is
filed, is actively contested and, after the court rules on some issues
(and in some cases, on central questions such as liability),9 the par-
ties reach an agreement; or (c) the parties settle their dispute prior
to the filing of the lawsuit and they file, simultaneously, a lawsuit
and a request that the court agree to the entry of judgment.'0
The next phase is the entry of the consent decree. In many
kinds of cases, the parties' request for entry of a consent decree
prompts judges simply to sign the documents presented. However,
in cases filed under certain statutes, in criminal cases, and in those
9 See, for example, Armstrong v. Board of School Directors of the City of Milwaukee,
616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980) (two trials on liability); Officers for Justice v. Civ. Serv. Comm.,
473 F. Supp. 801, 803 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 688 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1217 (1983) (six years of litigation, two weeks of trial).
10 See, for example, Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 320 (1928) (parties filed
complaint, answer, and request for entry of judgment on same day). According to one com-
mentator, almost one-third of the 93 Title VII decrees, agreed to by the Department of
Justice and by state and local governments and entered into from 1972 to 1983, were signed
by the court the day the complaint was filed. Maimon Schwarzchild, Public Law by Private
Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform,
1984 Duke L.J. 887, 913. It would be helpful to know how often consent decrees are filed in
this manner as well as in the other two ways described in the text.
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involving receiverships or class actions, the request for entry of a
consent judgment obliges the judge to do something more-to
make some assessments as a predicate to the court's entry of the
agreement as a consent decree." In these instances, we speak of
judicial "approval" or "acceptance" of the consent agreement.
The final phase, post-decree compliance, has three aspects:
implementation, enforcement, and modification. Implementation
requires the parties to transform their agreements from paper to
reality. The judge may have no involvement with implementation,
or consent decrees may specify that a judge or judge surrogate
(master, magistrate, special committee appointed by the court and
the like) monitor implementation. Enforcement is prompted by a
party complaining to the court that an opponent has failed to per-
form as required by the consent decree, whereas requests for modi-
fication seek court permission to alter all or some of the obligations
imposed by the decree.
C. The Possible Roles for Judges
The simplest way to delineate the many roles for judges in the
consent decree process is to chart the possibilities and then to dis-
cuss those central to this essay. As the chart below indicates, there
may be almost no role for a judge to take in the process, or that
role may be optional (within the judge's discretion) or mandated
by rule or custom. Further, the parties have some degree of control
over what role, if any, a judge may play. For example, if they con-
clude their negotiations prior to filing a complaint, parties can
foreclose the possibility of judicial involvement in the negotiation
phase.
As the chart demonstrates, judicial involvement can occur at
all stages of the consent decree process. In certain instances, judges
may have more than one possible role while, in other instances, the
judicial role may be unclear. For purposes of this discussion, I will
focus upon only three of the variants that are analytically possible.
" See, for example, the Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1982); Fed. Rule Crim.
Proc. 11; Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 23.1; Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 23(e).
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Phases of the Consent Decree Process Role of the Judge
None Optional Required
NEGOTIATION
negotiated without
litigation x
negotiated with litigation
but no adjudication x x
negotiated after adjudication x x*
ENTRY
no procedural rule or statutory
obligation for approval x
procedural rule or statute
requires approval x
COMPLIANCE
implementation x x
enforcement x** x
modification x** x
* The adjudication may have a critical impact on negotiations or may relate to issues that
have little or no effect on negotiations.
** The parties may seek court assistance but then, either with or without the court's help,
may reach an agreement obviating the need for judicial involvement.
My shorthand for Variant I is Party Control, and it assumes
that a consent decree has been negotiated solely by the parties,
with no judicial participation whatsoever. The case involves
neither a class action, nor a criminal proceeding, nor a special stat-
ute requiring the judge to treat the entry of a consent decree in
any particular manner. Compliance with the agreement may occur
with or without judicial involvement. This example is premised
upon maximum party control and minimal judicial involvement.
Variant II, Party Control/Judicial Approval, assumes no judi-
cial role in the negotiation of a consent decree but a more active
judicial role in approving the consent decree than under the previ-
ous example. Here, examples include the acceptance of guilty pleas
by federal judges under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the approval of class action settlements under Rule
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23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,12 two instances in
which judges have been given specific roles at entry of consent
decrees.
Variant III, Judicial Control, assumes that a judge is active
both in the creation of the agreement and then in its approval.
Again, class actions provide an example but, in contrast to Variant
II, the judge not only approves the settlement, the judge partici-
pates in the settlement negotiations and helps to engineer the set-
tlement. Under any of these approaches, compliance problems may
subsequently emerge and one of the parties may return to the
judge who approved the decree to obtain assistance in its enforce-
ment or to seek modification.
II. SOME HISTORY, LAW, AND PRACTICE
Agreed-upon judgments have been around for a long time, al-
though their ancestral forms may have gone by different names.
For example, Pollock and Maitland describe the "seisin under a
fine," which was the "final concord levied in the king's court" pro-
vided during the twelfth century.1 3 The "fine" was akin to a court
order,
roughly as being in substance a conveyance of land and
in form a compromise of an action. Sometimes the con-
cord puts an end to real litigation; but in the vast major-
ity of cases the litigation has been begun merely in order
that the pretended compromise may be made. 4
Pollock and Maitland provide explanations of the advantages
that flowed from "fines," as contrasted with land conveyances
made without court entry. ("The parties are merely doing by fine
what they could have done, though not so effectually, by a
deed."1 5) First, the "fines" provided "indisputable evidence of the
transaction"16 in an era when forgeries "were common.117 Second,
12 In both cases, dismissals as well as consent decrees are subjected to court scrutiny.
See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 48(a) and Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 23(e).
13 Frederick Pollock and Frederic Maitland, 2 The History of English Law 94-97 (1898)
("Pollock and Maitland"). Pollock and Maitland believe that "fines" were an ancient form:
"for the antiquity of fines," says Coke, "it is certain that they were very frequent
before the Conquest." We do not think that this can be proved for England, but in
Frankland the use of litigious forms for the purpose of conveyancing can be traced
back to a very distant date.
Id. at 95 (citations omitted).
14 Id.
15 Id. at 104.
16 Id. at 95. See also S.F.C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of The Common Law 181-
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by obtaining seisin under a fine, the parties were bound to per-
form; a party who failed in its obligations could be sued and im-
prisoned-powerful remedies at a time when "contractual actions,
actions on mere covenants, were but slowly making their way to
the royal court."18 Third, a "fine" gave the claimant protection "by
the court's ban,"1 9 establishing rights against "parties, privies and
strangers. ' 20 Those who contested such rights were supposed to
make their challenges during the court's term (often "a year and a
day").2 ' Belated claims were either barred or otherwise disadvan-
taged,22 although the preclusive effect of fines rested upon the fact
of one of the parties having been seised.2'
While a fine's evidentiary power was important, there were
other methods of obtaining proof of possessory rights. Apparently,
landowners -paid "money to the king,for the privilege of having
their compromises and conveyances entered among the financial
accounts rendered by the sheriffs. '2 But, the seisin under a fine
gave more protection, and to obtain it,
men... allowed a simulated action to go as far as a simu-
lated battle. The duel was "waged, armed and struck";
that is to say, some blows were interchanged, but then
the justices or the friends of the parties intervened and
made peace.... This had the same preclusive effect as a
duel fought to the bitter end. All whom it might concern
had notice that they must put in their claims at once or
be silent for ever.26
Pollock and Maitland also have something to teach us about
the role of the court in the entry of fines. After 1175, fines became
increasingly frequent.26 Parties commenced actions by a variety of
writs; occasionally fines ended "serious litigation," but "in general,
as soon as [the parties] were both before the court, they asked for
82 (1981).
17 Pollock and Maitland at 100 (cited in note 13).
Is Id. at 100-01.
19 Id. at 95.
20 Id. at 101.
21 Id. at 95.
22 Id.
213 Id. at 101. According to Philbrick, being "seised" loosely accorded with what today is
called possession. Francis S. Philbrick, Seisin and Possession as the Basis of Legal Title, 24
Iowa L. Rev. 268, 271-72 (1939).
2, Pollock and Maitland at 96).
25 Id. (citations omitted).
26 Id. at 97-98.
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leave to compromise their supposed dispute. 27 Compromising
without permission was an offense. The king made money from the
licenses sold to justices, and removing cases from dockets required
permission.28 With that permission, the parties then recited "the
terms of their compact. '29
Throughout the middle ages the justices exercise a cer-
tain supervision over the fines that are levied before
them. When a married woman is concerned, they ex-
amine her apart from her husband and see that she un-
derstands what she is doing. In other cases they do not
inquire into the subject matter of the compromise; they
have not to protect the material interests of the parties
or of strangers, but they do pretty frequently interfere to
maintain the formal correctness and the proprieties of
conveyancing: they refuse irregular fines. Even the formal
correctness of the arrangement they do not guarantee,
but they are not going to have their rolls defaced by obvi-
ously faulty instruments.30
I do not want to force historical antecedents or historical
truths. The fine might better be understood as the forerunner of
the declaratory judgment or in connection with the development of
confessions of judgment rather than as an example of a consent
decree. But the description that Pollock and Maitland provide is
parallel to the process followed today in the entry of some consent
decrees. Their description is in many ways like the Party Control
example (Variant I) sketched above. The judge seems to have had
no involvement with the negotiation of the fine; there may or may
not have been some highly stylized jousting, but ultimately the
parties worked out an agreement, and the court accepted that
agreement-checking only for facial defects.
Jumping centuries and continents, commentary and case law
in the United States generally assumed the availability of consent
decrees without much analysis of why courts provided them. Sev-
eral nineteenth and twentieth century legal treatises included con-
sent decrees in their list of the kinds of judgments courts ren-
dered."1 There was, however, some dispute about the nature of a
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 99 (citations omitted).
31 A. C. Freeman, A Treatise of the Law of Judgments (5th ed. 1925); Black, Judg-
ments (cited in note 3); William Meade Fletcher, A Treatise on Equity Pleading and Prac-
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consent decree. Some writers claimed that the decree was to be
understood as a private contract between the parties,32 whereas
other writers stated that a consent decree was more than a con-
tract; the decree was a "judicial act."3' As one treatise writer ex-
plained, the consent judgment is "the act of law, invoked by the
parties, in executing the agreement. . . . [T]he defendant merely
submits to what would, presumably, be done with or without his
assent. ' 34 Occasionally, practical effects flowed from the conceptu-
alization adopted. For example, in the days of more stringent
pleading rules, calling a consent judgment a "contract" permitted
its inclusion in a suit for breach of contract.35
The treatise writers expressed a view that the role of the
judge, when entering the consent decree, was limited. One com-
mentator asserted that the court had a "duty" to enter judgment
upon the parties' agreement 6 and that the court had "no power to
supplement or construe the agreement. 3 7 Even under this "duty"
model, however, the court did have some role to play other than
simply signing off. First, the court could only enter judgment in
actions over which subject matter jurisdiction existed; the court
presumably had authority to inquire into its own jurisdiction. 8
Second, the court could only enter judgment if consent in fact ex-
isted. The court could hold a hearing to obtain information on the
fact or validity (whether the signatories were capable of binding
themselves) of the consents given. 9 What the court did not do was
tice (1902). Compare American Law Institute, Restatement of Judgments (Second) (1982)
(no separate listing for consent judgments; discussed only as part of § 13 (former adjudica-
tion) and § 73 (relief from a judgment)).
3 Freeman, Judgments § 1350 at 2773 (cited in note 31). Note that the dispute about
whether a judgment was to be understood as a contract was not limited to the case of con-
sent judgments but included all judgments. Id. at 8. See William Blackstone, 3 Commen-
taries on the Laws of England 159-61 (Joseph Chitty, ed. 1826).
11 Black, Judgments at 14-15 (cited in note 3) ("The judgment is not the agreement; it
is the act of the law, invoked by the parties in executing the agreement."). While Black
accused Blackstorie of undue "love" of categories, and hence of a desire to call a consent
judgment a "contract," Black had a penchant for categorization as well. One of his reasons
for rebelling against calling a consent judgment a contract was because "it would be rash to
conclude that a tort is a contract." Id.
34 Id. (emphasis in original).
3 Id. at 12-13.
" Freeman, 3 Judgments § 1350 at 2764 (cited in note 31).
" Id., § 1350 at 2771.
3" Id., § 1350 at 2772. The assumption was that consent decrees could address matters
related to but beyond the pleadings; thus, the jurisdictional proposition was somewhat fuzz-
ier than this statement suggests. See, for example, Fletcher v. Holmes, 25 Ind. 458, 463
(1865); Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Steenman, 283 Ky. 317, 141 S.W.2d 265 (1940).
" Freeman, 3 Judgments § 1350 at 2772 (cited in note 31).
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make any determination of the merits. Consent judgments in-
volved "no judicial inquiry into, or preliminary adjudication of, the
facts or the law applicable thereto. ' 40 But, because the court had
entered the agreement as its judgment, the judgment stood as
would any other-with preclusive effect and protected from collat-
eral attack.41 Like Pollock and Maitland, the writers of treatises
describe a process that echoes the behavior sketched as Variant I.
Parties drafted agreements, and the court played only a minor
role, yet entry of those agreements gave them a power akin to that
of judgments rendered after adjudication.
Given the ambiguous nature of consent decrees, the source of
their power has always presented conceptual difficulties. As Corpus
Juris Secundum puts it, a consent decree "is not the judgment of
the court" but, because the court "allows it to go upon the record,"
a consent judgment has the "force and effect of a judgment. 42
Consent decrees have "judicial character" and "efficacy" but no ju-
dicial judgment.43 Rather, the entry of the judgment is a "mere
ministerial" act.44
The case law underscores the tensions suggested by the trea-
tises. The United States Supreme Court's descriptions of consent
decrees are illustrative. On one hand,
[p]arties to a suit have the right to agree to any thing
they please in reference to the subject-matter of their lit-
igation, and the court, when applied to, will ordinarily
give effect to their agreement, if it comes within the gen-
eral scope of the case made by the pleadings.4"
Further, courts must be circumspect when considering modifica-
tion of consent decrees.46 When interpreting a decree, judges are to
enforce the bargain made by the parties rather than the purposes
of the legislation that gave rise to the underlying action.47 Interpre-
41 Id., § 1350 at 2773.
41 Id., § 1350 at 2774. The judgment was "judicial ... and.., conclusive." Id. at 2775.
42 49 Corpus Juris Secundum, Judgments, § 173 at 308 (1947). See also Badgley v.
Santacroce, 800 F.2d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 955 (1987).
11 49 Corpus Juris Secundum, Judgments, § 173 at 308.
44 Id., § 176 at 312. See also State v. Jones, 252 Ala. 479, 41 So. 2d 280 (1949). In
contrast, another legal encyclopedia reminds us that consent judgments were not to be
treated as "mere contracts." 47 Am. Jur. § 1082 at 140 (1969).
" Pacific R.R. v. Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289, 297 (1879). The cases expounding upon con-
sent decrees are examples of federal common law in the making.
"8 See generally Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928); compare United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
47 U.S. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 237-38 (1975).
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tation and modification, when permissible, are supposed to depend
upon the written document-the "four corners" of the parties' con-
tract.48 Finally, judges may not require parties to accept provisions
within settlement agreements to which the parties have not con-
sented.49 In sum, there is a strand of the case law strongly commit-
ted to the party-control variant of the typology.
On the other hand,
parties cannot, by giving each other consideration,
purchase from a court of equity a continuing injunction.
[At least insofar as consent decrees based upon statutory
rights are concerned,] . . . the court is free to reject
agreed-upon terms as not in furtherance of statutory
objectives, [and] . . . to modify the terms of a consent
decree when a change in law brings those terms in con-
flict with statutory objectives."
Moreover, when law and equity were distinct, a consent decree was
sometimes viewed as less powerful than "a judgment of the court"
and thus, at least under the equity practice, a court had the ability
to decline to give a consent decree res judicata effect." And, of late
(again in certain kinds of cases), courts have declined to enforce
civil consent decrees when the decrees required government offi-
cials to comply with requirements courts have subsequently held
not to be constitutionally mandated. 2 Despite claims of reliance
18 United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971). But see Note, The Modifi-
cation of Consent Decrees in Institutional Reform Litigation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1020, 1029-30
(1986) (lower courts have not applied anti-modification doctrine as strictly to consent de-
crees in institutional reform cases). For a general discussion of the two standards, see Ruiz
v. Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1987), and Timothy S. Jost, From Swift to Stotts and
Beyond: Modification of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 1101 (1986).
4' Evans v. Jeff D., 106 S. Ct. 1531, 1538 (to be reported at 475 U.S. 717) (1986);
United States v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 799 F.2d 281, 292-96 (7th Cir. 1986).
00 System Federation v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 651 (1961). See also United States v.
Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932) (a court of equity has the power "to modify an injunc-
tion in adaptation to changed conditions though it was entered by consent").
5 Lawrence Manufacturing Co. v. Janesville Cotton Mills, 138 U.S. 552, 561 (1891).
See also Black, Judgments at 4-5 (cited in note 3) (decrees are more flexible than judg-
ments), and United States v. City of Jackson, Miss., 519 F.2d 1147, 1152 (5th Cir. 1975)
(courts appreciate the limits of consent decrees and give them less weight insofar as they
affect third parties).
02 See, for example, Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 1985) (jail officials not
required to obey restrictions on double bunking as set forth in consent decree entered into
prior to Supreme Court cases that did not impose such restrictions). Compare Badgley v.
Santacroce, 800 F.2d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1986) (also an overcrowding case; "The strong policy
encouraging settlement of cases requires that the terms of a consent judgment, once ap-
proved by a federal court, be respected as fully as a judgment entered after trial." (citation
omitted)). In general, the standard for enforcement of consent decrees appears to differ
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upon bargains, courts do not always enforce the bargains made.
Thus, there is a line of cases that bespeaks some fidelity to the
judicial-control variants described above."
One of the most recent Supreme Court pronouncements in
this area, Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland,4 aptly sums up
the doctrinal tensions.
To be sure, consent decrees bear some of the earmarks of
judgments entered after litigation. At the same time, be-
cause their terms are arrived at through mutual agree-
ment of the parties, consent decrees also closely resemble
contracts.... More accurately, then,... consent decrees
"have attributes of both contracts and of judicial de-
crees," a dual character that has resulted in different
treatment for different purposes.5
In short, just because a consent decree "looks like a judgment"
doesn't mean that it is one. 6
Before examining the recent Supreme Court discussions of ju-
dicial role in the consent decree process, I need to provide a bit of
description about other legal developments relevant to under-
standing the current state of the doctrine. First, as is familiar, in
1938 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective. The
Civil Rules were-and are-relatively silent about consent decrees.
Indeed, the Civil Rules provide no specific information on the con-
sent process, and litigators must improvise when submitting de-
from that imposed when the underlying issues have been litigated. See Laura Macklin, Pro-
moting Settlement, Foregoing the Facts, 14 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 1201, 1212-13
(1986); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1082-85 (1983). See also, Peter
M. Shane, Federal Policy Making by Consent Decree: An Analysis of Agency and Judicial
Discretion, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 241, 245-46, 268-70.
11 An advocate of the judicial-control approach is Professor Moore:
... the fact remains that the judgment is not an inter-partes contract; the court is
not properly a recorder of contracts, but is an organ of government constituted to
make judicial decisions and when it has rendered a consent judgment it has made
an adjudication.
lB James Moore, Jo Desha Lucas & Thomas Currier, Moore's Federal Practice § 0.409[5] at
330-331 (1984).
106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
15 Id. at 3074 (quoting United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 235-
37 (1975)). See also, United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673 (1971). At issue in Local
Number 93 was whether a trial judge could enter a consent decree in a Title VII action that
arguably went beyond a court's authority, under § 706g, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982), to
order relief after adjudication. The Court held that an "order" based upon a consent decree
was not an "order" for purposes of the statutory limitation. Id. at 3072.
" 106 S. Ct. at 3076.
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crees for entry.5 7 Further, the 1938 Civil Rules do not deal directly
with the general question of settlement, although mention is made
of cost-shifting penalties for failure to settles5 and of the require-
ment that class actions not be "dismissed or compromised without
court approval." 59 While the class action rule was substantially re-
vised in 1966, no additional discussion of the criteria for court ap-
proval of class action settlements has been provided.6 0 Neverthe-
less, court interpretation of that rule has been a major source of
information about the judicial role in consent decrees. 61 Coupled
with the suggestions of the Manual for Complex Litigation, 62 Rule
23 case law has provided a framework for judicial behavior in the
consent decree process."
Second, in 1983, the Civil Rules were amended in a manner
that has proved to be significant for this inquiry. For the first time,
the Rules gave judges express permission to facilitate "settle-
ment. '8 4 While judges had expressed interest in that topic before,
the 1983 amendments have encouraged them to articulate their
11 Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 54 and 58 discuss entry of judgment; Rule 41 provides for no-
tices of dismissal. Neither mentions judgments by consent.
8 Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 68 (1938).
' Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 23(c) (1938).
60 1966 Advisory Committee Note to Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 23(e) ("Subdivision (e) re-
quires approval of the court, after notice, for the dismissal or compromise of any class ac-
tion."). The question of the role of the judge in approving class action settlements seems not
to have been of much interest to the drafters of the 1938 rules or to subsequent revisers,
who left the original language intact: "a class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without approval of the court." See, for example, the minimal note to Rule 23(c) in the 1938
rules, the lack of additional exposition in the 1966 revisions, and the recent American Bar
Association proposal to amend Rule 23-including the notice requirements of 23(e)-but
not to describe with any more particularity the role of the court in approving class action
settlements in American Bar Association, Section of Litigation, Report and Recommenda-
tions of the Special Committee on Class Action Improvements, 110 F.R.D. 195 (1986)
("ABA Proposed Revisions"). Compare §§ 3475, 3068, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (Aug. 25, 1978)
(proposed statute for "reform of class action litigation procedures" and for "public and class
compensatory actions" would have required a judicial determination of the "fairness" of a
settlement as well as the "adequacy of representation").
61 See, for example, City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 462-64 (2d Cir.
1974); Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330-32 (5th Cir. 1977); Grunin v. International
House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123-25 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975).
62 Manual for Complex Litigation, Second, §§ 30.4-30.47 at 235-48 (West 1985).
63 Title VII litigation has also been an important source of description about a court's
role in consent decrees. Further, there has been some borrowing from discussions on the role
of courts when approving reorganizations under the Bankruptcy Act. See, for example, 11
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (1982), and Protective Committee for Independent Stockholders of
TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968).
6 Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 16(a)(5) lists, under the objective of the pretrial conference,
"facilitating the settlement of the case." Rule 16(c)(7) includes "the possibility of settle-
ment" under the subjects to be discussed at the pretrial conference.
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role as case "settlers" and to pursue that function with vigor.6 To-
day, judges openly participate in settlement discussions of civil
cases and claim abilities to provide important insights into the
kinds of agreements reached.6
Third, Congress has enacted legislation giving trial judges a
specific role in approving certain kinds of consent decrees; a few
statutes require judicial approval prior to the dismissal or compro-
mise of lawsuits.6 While some of these statutes are silent on the
question of how courts should discharge that task, a few, such as
an amendment (the Tunney Act) to the antitrust statutes, provide
some guidance. The Tunney Act requires judges to ascertain
whether, in antitrust suits brought by the government, a consent
decree serves the "public interest."68 Antitrust consent decrees
have long provided the occasion for court (and commentator) con-
sideration of consent decree issues, 9 but the cases tended to arise
after the entry of consent decrees-when one side's consent had
evaporated and requests for modification or nullification were
made.70 Similarly, a good deal of the case law on consent decrees in
general developed not at the time of the entry of the decree (after
all, both sides were championing it at that time) but subse-
quently-either when third parties claimed negative effects flowed
from the decree or when the parties attempted to rely upon a de-
cree in a second lawsuit. However, with the advent of the class ac-
"' See D. Marie Provine, Settlement Strategies for Federal District Judges (Federal Ju-
dicial Center, 1986); Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case
Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning, and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37
Rutgers L. Rev. 253 (1985); Marc Galanter, ..... A Settlement Judge, Not a Trial Judge:"
Judicial Mediation in the United States, 12 J.L. & Soc'y 1 (1985); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 485 (1985).
6 See Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Cases: The Agent Orange Exam-
ple, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 337 (1986). But see Hon. H. Lee Sarokin, Justice Rushed is Justice
Ruined, 38 Rutgers L. Rev. 431 (1986) (expressing skepticism about judicial settlement
activities).
67 See, for example, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1982) (antitrust); 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (1982) (aliens and
nationality); 12 U.S.C. § 67 (1982) (banking).
68 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h). Note that the statute has been held only to apply to settle-
ments by consent decree; despite a district judge's efforts to retain control, the Second Cir-
cuit concluded that parties who agree to the dismissal of an action otherwise subject to the
Tunney Act are beyond its purview. In re International Business Machines Corp., 687 F.2d
591, 601 (2d Cir. 1982).
" See, for example, Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928), and United
States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673 (1971); Milton Katz, The Consent Decree in Antitrust
Administration, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 415 (1940); Sigmund Timberg, Recent Developments in
Antitrust Consent Judgments, 10 Fed. Bar J. 351 (1949).
10 For example, Swift & Co., 276 U.S. at 311; United States v. Board of Educ. of City of
Chicago, 799 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1986).
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tion rule and statutes such as the Tunney Act, courts have also
been required to speak about their role at the time of the entry of
the decrees.
Fourth, when litigating statutory rights cases such as Title
VII,7 1 environmental cases, and constitutionally based institutional
reform cases, parties have turned to consent decrees with renewed
interest. 2 Because many of these cases involve either class actions
or intervention by third parties, the consent decree process has be-
come more visible. In contrast to the cases in which all the parties
consent and no one litigates, the multiple-party, multiple-claim
cases typical of Title VII, class action, and public law litigation
often include someone with interests that conflict with those of the
settlers. That someone-an intervenor, a dissatisfied member of a
class-may appear in court to argue against settlement.
Hence, contemporary judges who discuss the role of the court
in the consent decree process must respond to more issues than did
the writers of past generations. Local Number 93 again proves in-
structive. In that case, the Court described a series of tasks for
judges to complete prior to entry of a consent decree. Under Local
Number 93, courts may not enter a consent decree if they lack sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the dispute that gives rise to the de-
cree, if the decree is not within the "general scope" of the plead-
ings, or if the decree does not "further the objectives of the law
upon which the complaint was based. '7 3 Moreover, parties may not
obtain consent decrees that require action in violation of the stat-
ute under which the case was brought or is otherwise unlawful.74
And, under Firefighters v. Stotts, 75 one party cannot obtain modi-
fication of a consent decree over the objections of another party, if
that modification would not have been within a court's power to
order, had the underlying claim been adjudicated. In short, under
these cases (and even when no class action or other special statu-
tory scheme is involved), federal judges have-at least in
theory-several legal issues to resolve prior to the entry or modifi-
cation of consent decrees. A judge cannot simply "sign off" without
7, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982).
72 See generally Schwarzchild, 1984 Duke L.J. at 888 (cited in note 10); Note, 99 Harv.
L. Rev. at 1026-28 (cited in note 48); and Percival, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 328 (cited in
note 1).
71 106 S. Ct. at 3077. This statement may reflect a change in the law to expand the role
for the court, or the statement might be understood as explication of the long-held view that
consent decrees cannot be entered in violation of "public policy." See text at note 140.
74 Id.
75 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
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examining some of the underlying claims and the basis of the
court's authority. There appears to have been a shift in emphasis
in the case law to increased judicial control over consent decrees;
the contemporary world provides many examples of cases falling
within Variants II and III of the typology."
Yet the consent decree process still gives parties a substantial
arena in which to work, for the consent decree can be used to ob-
tain from courts that which could not have been achieved by litiga-
tion. In Local Number 93, the issue was whether a court could
enter a consent decree that required more by way of relief than a
federal court is permitted to order under Title VII. Justice Bren-
nan answered in the affirmative, thereby authorizing courts, at
least in some cases, to enter consent decrees that give "broader
relief than the court could have awarded after trial.1 77
It would be wrong to leave the discussion of the state of the
law and the practice without underscoring how ultimately muddy
it all is. One source of confusion is the ambiguity about how much
a judge may participate in shaping a consent decree. As noted,
since 1983, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
amended to authorize expressly judicial involvement in civil settle-
ment discussions, 8 judges have become increasingly vocal about
their role in helping the parties to reach an agreement. The Su-
preme Court, however, has taken two inconsistent positions on the
subject. On the one hand, in Evans v. Jeff D.,79 the Court recently
reiterated the rule that judges have no power to insist upon any
particular provision in a settlement. On the other hand, in Local
Number 93, the Court discussed with apparent approval the piv-
otal role of the trial judge in shaping the parties' agreement. The
trial judge there held hearings on a proposed settlement and then
sent the parties back to the drawing board with his suggestions
about what would be acceptable. The judge "persuaded the par-
ties" to consider a plan to which they eventually consented.80
76 This is part of a general trend towards increased judicial control of litigation. See
John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 823
(1985); compare Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374 (1982).
77 106 S. Ct. at 3077. Parties may also obtain, via consent decrees, agreements to have
specific performance of contracts-a remedy not often provided by the common law. See
Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 Yale L.J. 271 (1979).
7' Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 16(a)(5) and (c)(7). Compare Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(e)(1)
(judges may not participate directly in bargaining for settlement of criminal cases) and
United States v. Werker, 535 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1976). However, under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc.
11(e)(2)-(4), bargains can be conditional upon acceptance by a federal judge.
79 106 S. Ct. 1531, to be reported at 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
80 Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3069. The Agent Orange litigation provides another
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Thus, a sophisticated trial judge may exert substantial control by
carefully timing her or his views on the propriety of a given settle-
ment. A judge who tries, informally, to dictate terms before an
agreement has been finalized may convince the parties of the wis-
dom of the court's opinions, whereas a judge who responds within
the formal contours of a hearing on a proposed settlement is less
likely to receive appellate approval for the intervention.
A second source of confusion comes from a series of comments
by (now Chief) Justice Rehnquist. Dissenting from the summary
affirmance in a case challenging the trial court's activities in the
AT&T antitrust settlement, Justice Rehnquist (joined by Justices
White and Chief Justice Burger) argued that once the parties had
agreed to withdraw or to settle a lawsuit, no "case or controversy"
existed; therefore, judges lacked the power to insist upon any par-
ticular agreement.8s Presumably, under this view, legislation such
as the Tunney Act or court rules like Rule 23(e) of the Civil Rules
are unconstitutional grants of authority to federal courts, and
judges cannot inquire into any terms of parties' agreements."2 At
one level, this claim appears to be a version of the old "duty" argu-
ment; the parties make their deal and the court dutifully enters it.
But conceptually, there seems to be a problem. While Justice
Rehnquist did not so state, a logical but radical application of his
view is that, if there is no case or controversy, courts have no
power to enter a consent decree at all. 3
example. Chief Judge Jack Weinstein, to whom the case had been assigned, was an active
participant in the settlement negotiations. Schuck, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 348-50 (cited in
note 66); Ralph Blumenthal, How U.S. Judge Forced Agent Orange Pact, New York Times
(May 11, 1984), part 1, p. 1, col. 2. Thereafter, Judge Weinstein presided at Rule 23(e)
"fairness" hearings and upheld the settlement over some class members' challenges. In re
"Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), 611 F.
Supp. 1396 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), af'd in part and rev'd in part, 818 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1987)
(settlement was "in the best interests of the class").
" Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001, 1004 (1983).
82 The practice of obtaining judicial approval on the criminal side may survive such a
position. The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution requires that criminal defend-
ants may only waive their rights to trial if they have done so knowingly and voluntarily.
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 766 (1970); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459,
466 (1969). One might conceptualize a criminal controversy as extant until after court deter-
mination of a defendant's waiver of rights. See also Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Rinaldi v.
United States, 434 U.S. 22, 34 (1977) (assuming the legality of Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 48(a),
which permits indictments to be dismissed only "by leave of court").
83 Schwarzchild, 1984 Duke L.J. at 902-03 (cited in note 10) notes the absence of ad-
verseness but concludes that consent decrees are like other anomalous procedures such as
uncontested bankruptcy proceedings and naturalization and that Article III limitations are
not problematic. Further, Schwarzchild takes comfort in congressional affirmation of the
federal courts' role in settlement of Title VII actions. Id. at 904. Of course, Congress cannot
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Finally, in Local Number 93, Justice Rehnquist muddied the
waters even further. Protesting a court's entry of a consent decree
that the parties had negotiated but to which an intervenor ob-
jected, Justice Rehnquist suggested that some new form of judg-
ment might be available. In an unclear reference, he stated "a ju-
dicial decree to which the parties agree may be entered over the
objections of an intervenor as of right; but the question is whether
such a decree is properly called a 'consent decree' or a coercive
court order. '84 Intervenors are not the only people who may object
to proposed consent decrees; many class action consent decrees are
approved over the objections of class members. Justice Rehnquist
may thus have called into question a relatively common practice. It
is not clear whether he was signalling doubts only about interven-
tion, consent decrees, and nomenclature, or whether he was contin-
uing to raise questions about the propriety, in general, of entering
such decrees.
In sum, we do not have a much firmer grip upon the meaning
of the consent decree process than did treatise writers fifty years
ago. That something is a judicial act but not a judicial judgment is
intrinsically troubling and has caused not only conceptual confu-
sion but also practical complexity. Neither judges, lawyers, nor
parties know exactly what they give or get when a consent decree
is entered. The history of the last six years of litigation about the
"consent" decree between the federal government and the Chicago
Board of Education bears testimony to the negative consequences
of the ambiguity that surrounds consent decrees.8 5 Hence, it is nec-
essary to return to the initial questions.
Given the possible modes of judicial behavior during the con-
sent decree process, given the ambiguous status of the judgments
entered, should anything be done about the consent decree pro-
cess? Should courts be in the business of offering consent decrees?
In all kinds of cases? What interests are served by the continuing
provision of consent decrees? Does the availability of consent de-
crees facilitate private agreements or serve the judiciary's needs?
confer power on the federal courts beyond that provided by Article III.
" Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3084-85 n.* (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original).
85 United States v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 799 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1986). The
appellate court instructed the district court not to adjudicate but to "settle" the case
(whatever that means). Id. at 290 ("[Ilt was and still is imperative that the district court
make every effort to settle this dispute before imposing its own determination of appropri-
ate relief."). The appellate opinion was frank in its discussion of the confusion spawned by
the consent decree entered in 1980.
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Or, are we simply following-without much reflection-a historical
form that, with the advent of sophisticated recordation devices,
has outlived its utility? In short, can the continued availability of
consent decrees be justified on the basis of judicial role during the
consent decree process? If so, are all variants of the typology
equally acceptable as modes of litigant-judge interaction?
III. EVALUATING CONSENT DECREES
A. The Praise
Despite the ambiguities that surround consent decrees, many
litigants (or their lawyers) continue to seek them, and many judges
and commentators continue to praise them. Thus, it should be ac-
knowledged at the outset of this evaluative discussion that
whatever the theoretical and conceptual difficulties, the literature
generally assumes that consent decrees are desirable forms. Before
providing an analysis of assumptions made in support of consent
decrees, I set forth some of the advantages ascribed to them.
The perceived benefits of consent decrees are several, some
reminiscent of Pollock and Maitland and others part of a general
contemporary celebration of settlement. First, consent decrees are
frequently assumed to save both litigants and courts the expenses
of litigation while enabling results akin to those produced by litiga-
tion."6 Second, statements are made about the utility of consent
decrees in diminishing risks. One kind of risk is the unknown out-
come that those in the midst of adjudication face. Hence,
"[c]ertainty and reasoned reliance have always been the sine qua
non of the consent orders that terminate about 70% to 80% of the
antitrust complaints ... filed by the Justice Department. '8 7 A sec-
ond kind of risk is that the outcome reached will not be imple-
mented. Some courts and commentators believe that agreements
founded upon consent will be voluntarily implemented more read-
ily and easily than those founded upon force."
These assumptions about compliance are rooted in symbolism
'8 Katz, 53 Harv. L. Rev. at 418 (cited in note 69).
87 United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 249 (1975) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
Is "[W]hen agreement is reached by consent, voluntary compliance is more likely ....
United States v. City of Miami, Fla., 614 F.2d 1322, 1333 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd in part on
unrelated grounds, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc). See also Local Number 93, 106 S.
Ct. at 3072 ("Congress intended for voluntary compliance to be the preferred means of
achieving the objectives of Title VII."); Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 923 (6th Cir.
1983); Menkel-Meadow, 33 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 504 (cited in note 65) (settlement "offers...
substantive justice that may be more responsive to the parties' needs than adjudication").
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and practice. Consent judgments (or at least some kinds of consent
judgments) seem weightier and more portentous than do contracts.
Some of the notions of solemnity, of import to Pollock and
Maitland, endure in both the case law and the commentary. The
symbolic import flows both from the relative infrequency of judg-
ments, as compared to contracts, and from the nomenclature. Al-
though consent judgments may be judicial "acts" without judicial
"judgment," the terminology helps to confuse us-to lull us into an
assumption that a judge has had something meaningful to do with
the obligations imposed. Failing to perform under a consent decree
is a violation of the "law," whereas failing to perform as required
by a contract-even though a transgression of the law of con-
tracts-is somehow less obviously a breach of the law. Parties to a
judgment are thought to understand themselves as more "bound"
than those obliged "only" by contract, and nonparties are assumed
to understand the violation of a consent judgment as more egre-
gious than is a breach of contract.8 9
The apparent authoritativeness of consent decrees is rein-
forced by practice. Parties to a consent decree have (at least in
theory) a priority in the court queue and, with their "court order"
in hand, may seek the remedy of contempt. Moreover, consent
judgments continue to function as recordation devices and mecha-
nisms by which those who have judgments-rather than "mere"
contracts-are given priorities not only in their return to court but
in other contexts; "judgment creditors" may be treated differently
than other categories of creditors, and judgments are readily en-
forceable across jurisdictional lines.90
A third line of support celebrates consent decrees as exercises
of parties' autonomy. Because the parties, not the court, determine
the remedy, the assumption is that the remedy is better suited to
the parties' needs. For example, Robert Mnookin and Lewis Korn-
hauser have written about theutility of consent decrees in divorce
89 Schwarzchild, 1984 Duke L.J. at 899 (cited in note 10), speaks of the "moral author-
ity" of court orders, including those entered by consent. See also United States v. City of
Miami, Fla., 664 F.2d at 439-40 (a consent decree has "greater finality than a compact"),
and Mnookin and Kornhauser, 88 Yale L.J. at 992 (cited in note 2) (ceremonial benefits).
But see text at note 103 (the problem of nonenforcement of alimony and child support
orders).
10 Consent judgments, unlike contracts, are afforded full faith and credit in other juris-
dictions. See generally Hiroshi Motomura, Using Judgments as Evidence, 70 Minn. L. Rev.
979 (1986); American Law Institute, Restatement of Judgments (Second) § 13 (1982). Judg-
ments may constitute liens for purposes of the bankruptcy laws. See 11 U.S.C. § 547. The
Uniform Commercial Code also recognizes judgments as the basis for claims. See, for exam-
ple, Cal. Commercial Code § 9-501(5).
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and custody disputes. Mnookin and Kornhauser believe that the
parties have more information than would a judge, can assess their
own needs with greater accuracy, can plan for future contingencies,
and can shape agreements with less pain than would be required if
adjudication had occurred. 1 A related theme is flexibility; consent
decrees may provide what courts cannot order. Further, consent
decrees permit court orders without going through a lawsuit that
neither party wants.
A flip side of the autonomy argument is one that conceives of
consent decrees as useful vehicles for court control over parties.
For example, when one party fears noncompliance, that party may
prefer a consent decree to a contract. In cases involving agree-
ments that structure parties' relations over a period of years, liti-
gants may anticipate problems during the compliance phase.
"[C]ontinuing oversight and interpretation by the court" are seen
as critical.2 Given the individual calendar system in the federal
courts, signatories to consent decrees have a right-of-return and
preferred access not only to the federal courts but perhaps to the
very judge who participated in the negotiation of, approved and, in
any event, entered the decree.
Court control may be seen as desirable for reasons other than
fear of noncompliance. Involvement of a judge may be used to su-
pervise the parties-to ensure that the parties are treating each
other or third parties appropriately. The court-as-parent may, for
example, inquire into the adequacy of the consent given to an
agreement while avoiding the task of actually deciding the merits
of a dispute. In criminal cases and in civil cases in which court
approval of consent decrees is required, courts speak of themselves
as "guardians" of the interests of the parties and/or of the public.
But, by virtue of the consent decree, that guardianship need not be
translated into an obligation to adjudicate."3 A framework that reg-
ulates behavior has been created without the issuance of a court
decision on what societal norms require in a given situation. The
resultant uncertainty about those norms may be viewed as a safety
valve; consent decrees could be among the panoply of devices ena-
bling "passive virtue." 94
' Mnookin and Kornhauser, 88 Yale L.J. at 956-58 (cited in note 2). See also Easter-
brook, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 21-30 (cited in note 1).
92 Schwarzchild, 1984 Duke L.J. at 899 (cited in note 10), quoted in Local Number 93,
106 S. Ct. at 3076 n.13.
"The protective rationale is often used in the class action context. See, for example,
Liebman v. J.W. Petersen Coal & Oil Co., 73 F.R.D. 531, 534 (N.D. Il1. 1973).
9' Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Vir-
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Such are the benefits ascribed to consent decrees. But that list
does not end the inquiry into either the fact of such benefits or the
propriety of judges bestowing them. Consent decrees, after all, are
contracts transformed because the parties to the contract have the
resources-in terms of dollars and power-to get the seal of the
court. To provide that seal, judges spend some time. While that
time may be minimal in many cases, 95 the time investment can be
substantial when numbers of people are affected. Further, once the
court's seal has been attached, parties may successfully invoke the
court's name and resources to enforce the decree.9 6 While the
courts are in the business, generally, of enforcing contracts, should
the courts give priority and sanctity to this subset of contracts?
Are we inappropriately permitting some litigants to purchase court
powers? Are we asking judges to enter judgments based upon in-
trinsically suspect information? Or are we properly empowering
judges to discharge a task to which they are well suited?
Consent judgments need to be scrutinized to decide whether
judicial "action without judgment" remains a valuable form. What
benefits are in fact conferred by consent decrees on the parties, the
courts, and the public? One way to approach this issue would be to
attempt to understand the advantages that the availability of con-
sent decrees provide for those who would otherwise be left to con-
tract, and then, to consider the advantages provided for those who
would otherwise be left to litigate. However, because both private
contract and adjudication are often the alternatives, this approach
builds in redundancy. Another analysis might proceed by consider-
ing first the benefits to individuals, then to groups, to courts, and
tues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1961). I have borrowed Professor Bickel's phrase, but consent
decrees do not fit exactly within his meaning. Bickel discussed the Supreme Court's deci-
sions to decline to exercise jurisdiction, so as to avoid deploying its "prestige, the spell it
casts as a symbol." Id. at 48. Consent decrees are not quite as "passive" (within Bickel's
terms) as justiciability doctrines, for consent decrees do place the power and prestige of
courts behind certain outcomes. On the other hand, principled articulation is left for an-
other time.
9 Commentators on the function of consent decrees in antitrust enforcement note that
court review (prior to the Tunney Act) was pro forma and that judges made no changes in
the detailed documents presented to them. See Milton Goldberg, The Consent Decree: Its
Formulation and Use (Occasional Paper No. 8, Graduate School of Business Administration,
Michigan State University 1962) at 20. For discussion of court review in other contexts, see
Schwarzchild, 1984 Duke L.J. at 913 (cited in note 10), and William McDonald, Judicial
Supervision of the Guilty Plea Process: A Study of Six Jurisdictions, 70 Judicature 203, 211
(1987) (judges spent average of 7 to 8 minutes per guilty plea accepted).
98 As Fleming James put it, a consent decree commits society's resources to enforce-
ment and implementation of the contractual agreements made by the parties. See Fleming
James, Jr., Consent Judgments as Collateral Estoppel, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 173, 175 (1959).
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to the public at large, but again the overlapping benefits would en-
tail repeated analysis, and these categories may not, in fact or the-
ory, be distinct. I have chosen a third route (with less, but still
some overlap)-to examine the list provided above, to group justi-
fications so as to articulate specific arguments in favor of judicial
provision of consent decrees, and then to consider the factual as-
sumptions and implications of each claim.
B. The Assumptions
1. Economy. This argument assumes that the provision of con-
sent decrees enables courts to clear their dockets because more
lawsuits end-and end less expensively-than would have, were
consent decrees unavailable. This approach, relying upon the as-
sumed advantages of risk reduction, diminution of expense, and
the symbolic power of decrees, claims that consent decrees benefit
private individuals, the courts, and the public at large. Further, the
concern here is relatively narrow; economy is translated as saving
only dollars and time.
Critical to endorsing consent decrees as a form of settlement
to be encouraged is the premise that, in some set of cases, parties
will agree to a consent decree but would have been unwilling to
conclude their dispute without a consent decree. In other words,
this argument compares consent decrees both to adjudication and
to contract and finds reasons to prefer consent decrees. While pro-
ponents of this view cannot identify with any empirical precision
the cases for which consent decrees are desirable,97 there are a se-
97 The Rand Federal Court Data Base (cited in note 7) using data gathered by the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, provides some information about what kinds of
cases are concluded most frequently by consent judgments. Of approximately 270,000 re-
ported cases concluded in 1985, 5.8% (or some 15,700) were disposed of with what the Ad-
ministrative Office designated "consent judgments." In addition, the Administrative Office
reported that another 47.4% of the total caseload ended in "settlement." The Administra-
tive Office also codes lawsuits by the "nature of the suit." The data are obtained in each
jurisdiction by court clerks, who review the civil cover sheets that plaintiffs' attorneys must
complete. Boxes are provided to describe the lawsuit; only one "nature of suit" designation
is permitted per case. Thus, the accuracy of the data base depends upon two sets of cod-
ers-attorneys and court clerks-and on their shared perceptions of the meaning of the
categories provided, of the most important description of a given lawsuit, and of the kind of
termination achieved.
A quantitative analysis to determine which variables (such as identity of party, identity
of opponent, nature of suit, region in which a lawsuit is filed, nature of relief, presence of
third parties) are critical to the kind of disposition (consent judgment versus settlement
with a dismissal) must await refinement of the data base-to ascertain whether the "consent
judgment" and "settlement" categories are in fact discrete and uniform across coders and to
disaggregate from the "settlement" category those cases concluded with an agreement that
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ries of possible candidates. For example, parties who anticipate
post-contract enforcement failures could view consent decrees as
essential. In fact, reported decisions of (not to be confused with
aggregate data about) public law cases, in which the government is
a party, feature consent decrees with some regularity. Opponents
of the government may well be concerned about the ability of offi-
cials to bind future administrators."8 Consent decrees offer some
protection against changes in policy and make plain that, at least
in the instance in question, a specific member of the government
has on behalf of the government promised that other government
officials will behave in a particular way.9 Another visible set of
is functionally similar to a consent judgment.
On the basis of the data in their present state, cases described as "veterans' benefits"
have the highest percentage of consent judgments (31.65 %). These cases were also the most
frequent type of suit concluded in 1985, the year analyzed (17% of the total caseload). Stu-
dent loan and contract cases have the next highest percentage of consent judgments-with
13.4% and 10% respectively. In 1985, student loan cases were 3% of the total caseload, and
contract cases were 9% of the caseload. Civil rights cases, including voting, job discrimina-
tion, accommodations, and welfare cases (which may be statutorily or constitutionally
based) comprised 4.8% of all consent judgments recorded-and were 7.6% of the total
caseload concluded. Antitrust cases were 0.44% of the total caseload concluded, and such
cases were 0.35% of the total number of consent judgments.
Another aet of relevant comparisons is the kind of disposition by nature of suit. For
example, of all veterans' benefits cases concluded, 11% ended with consent judgments; of all
student loan cases concluded, 28.1% ended with consent judgments; of all contract cases,
6.3% ended with consent judgments; of all civil rights cases, 42.2% ended with consent
judgments; of all antitrust cases, 4.5% ended with consent judgments.
Another cut through the data is by the identity of the litigant. For example, in those
cases in which the United States was a party, 4.2% ended in consent decrees as opposed to
1.8% of the cases in which the United States was not involved. The federal government is a
litigant in veterans' benefits and student loan cases, thus raising the possibility that the
identity of a litigant may be a significant factor in explaining the method of termination of a
lawsuit.
The numbers suggest that, despite the dominance of injunctive cases as our images for
the prototypical consent judgment, cases involving monetary relief conclude with some fre-
quency with consent judgments as well. On the other hand, our perception of the frequency
of civil rights consent judgments is reaffirmed by the high percentage of that form of conclu-
sion within that category of case (plus the high visibility of that kind of case). But no firm
impressions should be drawn from the data. A percentage may only be an artifact of sample
size. For example, 40% of all liquor cases ended in consent judgments but there were only
five reported liquor cases concluded. An analysis that controls for sample size is necessary to
compare the uses of consent judgments within and among the various types of cases.
See Neuborne and Schwarz, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 186-87 (cited in note 1).
Concerned about being bound by consent decrees, Attorney General Meese has is-
sued guidelines that prevent federal agency officials from entering into consent decrees that
limit official discretion. Departures from the guidelines must be approved by high-ranking
members of the Justice Department. Memorandum from the Attorney General, Department
Policy Concerning Consent Decrees and Settlement Agreements (March 13, 1986), reprinted
in part at Department of Justice Guidelines, 54 U.S.L.W. 2492 (April 1, 1986). Discussion by
Justice Department officials at the Legal Forum symposium suggested that the current ad-
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consent decree cases involve antitrust; the government-here a fre-
quent plaintiff-has had an express policy of using the consent de-
cree as a tool of enforcement less expensive, and sometimes more
far-reaching, than adjudication. 00
What we do not know is what would have happened to these
cases if consent decrees were not available-if the parties had had
to choose between the risks and costs of private contracts or the
risks and costs of adjudication. We also do not know how many
case filings are inspired by the availability of consent judgments.
How many contemporary litigants, like Pollock and Maitland's me-
dieval combatants, are simply trying (with some half-hearted
jousting) to obtain court recordation of their rights but have no
interest in full-fledged adjudication? If consent judgments were
not an option, would we have more private consensual agreements?
Or more "lumping it"-not seeking to have one's rights vindi-
cated? 10' Or more adjudication?
At least at a general level (as contrasted with case-specific in-
formation), we have no current means to determine whether the
availability of consent decrees reduces the total number of cases to
which courts must respond. Further, given the extensive litigation
in some of the reported cases involving "consent" decrees, we can-
not say with certainty that the net costs of disputing in a world
with consent decrees are less than the net costs of disputing in a
world without consent decrees. While money is saved in some in-
stances (and makes a claim of "cheaper" tempting), post-decree
litigation (on both the civil and criminal sides) requires caution in
pronouncements on economy.
2. Certainty and Increased Compliance. Another set of en-
dorsements of consent decrees comes from the assumption that
those bound by consent decrees in fact behave differently than
ministration is unhappy with some of the consent decrees entered into during the Carter
administration. See also Shane, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 242, 279-90 (cited in note 52).
100 The United States' active antitrust enforcement efforts in the 1930s prompted com-
mentators to express concern about the ability of the government to file criminal and civil
prosecutions simultaneously and to use the criminal action to "bludgeon" a defendant into
assenting to a consent decree far broader than the antitrust laws would have required. Katz,
53 Harv. L. Rev. at 424 (cited in note 69). Commentators praising the vigor of government
antitrust enforcement also noted that the preference for consent decrees was sometimes
prompted by the uncertainty of legal parameters. William J. Donovan and Breck P. McAl-
lister, Consent Decrees in the Enforcement of Federal Anti-Trust Laws, 46 Harv. L. Rev.
885, 911-12 (1933).
'' William L. F. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9
L. & Soc. Rev. 63, 76 (1974) (the variable costs of avoidance); William L. F. Felstiner,
Avoidance as Dispute Processing: An Elaboration, 9 L. & Soc. Rev. 695 (1975).
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those bound by contract or by adjudication. The symbolic power of
consent decrees, their certainty, the assumed ease of enforcement,
and the participation of the litigants in the formulation of the or-
ders are presumed to yield greater fidelity to the agreement. As a
consequence, we all benefit.
While there is some intuitive appeal to believing that consent
decrees have greater meaning than private obligations and have
more persuasive force than court decrees imposed after adjudica-
tion, we have meager data to validate our intuitions. 102 Moreover,
we know that, at least in certain kinds of cases, people violate
court decrees with regularity. Compliance with alimony and child
support orders is notoriously low.103 The voluminous post-decree
litigation in school desegregation and in prison and mental hospital
conditions cases bears testimony to the lack of fidelity to court de-
crees in general10 4 and, in some cases, to parties' willingness to vio-
102 One of the few studies of which I am aware reviewed compliance with mediated
outcomes in small claims court and concluded that "consensual solutions are more likely to
be complied with than those imposed by adjudication .... " See Craig A. McEwen and
Richard J. Maimon, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance Through Con-
sent, 18 L. & Soc. Rev. 11, 47 (1984). Note that the participants in the mediations helped to
shape the solutions and may not have been willing to agree to "solutions" with which the
participants would not have been able to comply. See also note 103.
103 "Of the 4 million women due child support payments in 1981, 45% received the full
amount due." Ruth Sanders, Child Support and Alimony: 1981 (Advance Report) (Bureau
of the Census, May 1983); Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution 283-85 (1985). A
subsequent report describes two kinds of payment arrangements, "court-ordered" and "vol-
untary." U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series p-23, No. 141,
Child Support and Alimony: 1983, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
(1985). The two categories are not defined. From the report, one cannot know if consent
decrees were included under the "court ordered" or the "voluntary" category. Forty percent
of the women surveyed received full payment of "court-ordered" alimony, while 69% re-
ceived full payment of "voluntary" alimony. Thirty-two percent of the women awarded
"court-ordered" alimony received none of the payments, while only 9% of the women with
"voluntary" arrangements received no payments. Whatever "voluntary" means, those who
fall within that category receive more payments than those in the "court-ordered"
group-thus supporting a compliance-is-better-with-consent theory but not necessarily sup-
porting a compliance-is-better-with-consent-decrees theory.
104 For example, litigation against the Arkansas prison system began in 1968 and re-
sulted in findings of unconstitutional conditions in 1972. See Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp.
825 (E.D. Ark. 1969) (Holt I); 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (Holt II), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 442 F.2d 304, 307-08 (8th Cir. 1971). Efforts to bring the prison into compli-
ance with court orders lasted beyond 1978. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681 (1978).
The Court did not relinquish jurisdiction until 1982. Finney v. Mabry, 546 F. Supp. 628
(E.D. Ark. 1982). See generally M. Kay Harris and Dudley P. Spiller, Jr., After Decision:
Implementation of Judicial Decrees in Correctional Settings (1976). For description of the
difficulties of implementation in cases involving mental hospitals, see Note, The Wyatt
Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change, 84 Yale L.J. 1338
(1975); for school desegregation cases, see generally, United States Civil Rights Commission,
Desegregation-1976, Twenty Years After (1976), and Norman Dorsen, Paul Bender, Burt
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late consent decrees as well.1"5
We do not know how often parties obliged by adjudication fail
to perform, or how often parties obliged by consent decree fail to
perform, or how often parties obliged by contract fail to perform.
We do not know how often, in instances of any of these failures,
the other party does not seek to insist upon compliance. In short,
we do not know whether we would have more or less or the same
amount of compliance in a world without consent decrees. 10 6 Liti-
gants, judges, and the public may be in search of certainty, but we
cannot say with assurance that consent decrees provide safe haven.
3. Autonomy, Efficiency, and Flexibility. Consent judgments
may be understood as "better" than adjudication. While "better"
may sometimes simply mean cheaper and quicker, "better" also
has a qualitative theme: that consent is a preferable basis for ac-
tion because the parties are exercising their own powers, because
the parties have better information than courts can ever have, be-
cause the parties may do voluntarily what they may not do under
compulsion, or because state authority will be conserved rather
than deployed. These claims are at the heart of the pro-settlement
movement,1 7 but do not, by their own force, result in a pro-
consent decree view. One can obtain settlements without consent
decrees; moreover, consent decrees do pose the threat of state force
and thus do not celebrate individual autonomy as much as do pri-
Neuborne, and Sylvia Law, Political and Civil Rights in the United States ch. XXVIII (4th
ed. 1979).
'05 See, for example, United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987) (repeated fail-
ures to comply with consent decree on discriminatory employment practices); United States
v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 799 F.2d 281, 281-82 (7th Cir. 1986) (six years of post-
consent decree litigation contesting the meaning of the agreement); Badgley v. Santacroce,
800 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1986) (violations of a consent decree; district judge's refusal to enforce
decree reversed). Compare Gomes v. Moran, 605 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1979) (prison officials
transferred inmates in violation of a consent decree; court declined to enforce the bargain
since the law no longer required the defendants to behave in the manner to which they had
consented). For a brief time, the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division had an enforce-
ment unit, whose purpose was to monitor implementation. That unit was disbanded in 1982,
but perhaps study of its work might inform the issues raised in the text. See Owen M. Fiss,
Injunctions 409 (1972).
1o For discussion of increased compliance after mediation, see McEwen and Maimon,
18 L. & Soc. Rev. at 47 (cited in note 102). If consent were the critical variable, then one
would expect to find comparable compliance rates under contracts and under consent
decrees.
'" Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 494,
536-38 (1986). See also Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the
Gray, 70 Judicature 161 (1986); Raymond Lloyd Co. v. District Court for the 20th Judicial
District, 732 P.2d 612 (1987) (local rule imposing $500 fine for settling on eve of trial is
impermissible but settlement itself is a laudable goal).
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vate consensual agreements.
The autonomy rationale for consent decrees is bolstered by
coupling it with arguments from history and practice. Hundreds of
years of practice bear witness to the fact that some litigants want
consent decrees rather than "mere" contracts or "full-fledged" ad-
judication. Further, insisting upon full litigation may be costly-by
a variety of definitions 08-and advantages may flow from detailing
the legal rights and obligations of specific individuals in identifi-
able contexts. 109
In addition, some argue that consent decrees are more effi-
cient. Under this view, given the information available and the
costs of information exchange and presentation, the decisions of
parties are always to be preferred to those of judges; when the par-
ties choose to obtain judgments by consent rather than by adjudi-
cation, those choices should be respected.110 Finally, by requiring
full adjudication or nothing, we might be exacting an inappropri-
ately high price for courts' judgments. And, if we jettisoned con-
sent decrees, would we also have to do without consent at other
moments in the adjudication process? Could parties still enter into
stipulations agreeing about the applicable legal principles or about
the underlying facts? Or would courts have to adjudicate every ele-
ment of a judgment?
In short, what's wrong with the flexibility of these modes?
Why not offer the protection of a judgment to those who seek it,
thereby saving the expense of demanding either that the parties
bear the risks of private accords or that the parties engage in a
series of sometimes empty charades-litigating that which they do
not contest, spending their and our time and money, all to obtain a
court's judgment?
Once again, we are information-poor. We do not know how
"08 Costs of tort litigation, defined as the expenses of both parties and of the court
system, were between 15 and 19 billion dollars in 1985. The tort system delivered, in com-
pensation to plaintiffs, between 13 and 15 billion dollars. James Kakalik and Nicholas Pace,
Costs and Compensation Paid in Tort Litigation 3-4 (Rand Corporation, Institute for Civil
Justice 1986). That somewhat narrow definition of costs (for example, no measure of the
emotional pain of the litigants is included) needs further development, as does the equation
of the delivery of compensation with the benefits bestowed by litigation. For a refusal to
equate the amount of money that changed hands with the value or utility of the litigation,
see Justice Brennan's majority opinion in City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S. Ct. 2686, 2694
(1986) (attorneys' fees award may exceed the monetary compensation to the plaintiff).
109 The recognition of declaratory judgments suggests their possible social utility. See
28 U.S.C. § 2201, enacted in 1948. See generally Developments in the Law, Declaratory
Judgments-1941-49, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 787 (1949).
110 Easterbrook, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 21-30 (cited in note 1).
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much the demand for court decrees is driven by the availability of
consent decrees or what kinds of practices might emerge to replace
them. Might other, yet presumably more efficient modes, evolve?
Or is the form indigenous? If banned, would it simply reemerge
under another name? Of course, we have upon occasion altered our
forms of dispute resolution-provided one sort or prohibited an-
other. For example, before 1925, when the Federal Arbitration Act
revised the common law rule, contracts to arbitrate were not en-
forceable in federal court because of the view that arbitration im-
properly divested courts of a role that belonged to them,11' and
judicial decision making is still preferred to arbitration in some
instances." 2
The example of changing views towards arbitration under-
scores the fact that consent decrees are not quite creatures of con-
tract. The parties do not simply, in a burst of autonomy and effi-
ciency, produce judgments. Third parties-the court as an
accomplice, other litigants, individuals possibly affected by the
agreement, and all.of us who provide the social context in which
the courts exist-have interests that may be affected when parties
attach the word "judgment" to their agreements. Moreover, prior-
ity in the court queue is not the only interest at stake. Consent
decrees, like arbitration, preclude judicial judgments that could in-
form us of the meaning and requirements of legal obligations. Per-
haps consent decrees in some or all areas should be unavailable."13
On the other hand, when faced with the choice of the risks and
uncertainties of contractual agreements and the risks and uncer-
tainties of litigation, we do not know how many would opt for the
former. If no lawsuits were ever filed, we (third parties) would lose
all information about the existence of a dispute and the manner in
which it was resolved. But would underlying behavior change if
one were faced with a choice between negotiation and full-fledged
adjudication? Might fewer disputes in fact arise? Finally, the ab-
sence of consent decrees would not, by its own force, require the
abandonment of other forms of stipulations, narrowing the facts or
I" The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1982). See Linda R.
Hirschman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 Va.
L. Rev. 1305 (1985).
"2 Compare Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 432-35 (1953); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985); and McMahon v. Shearson/Ameri-
can Express, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
"I See Fiss, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 12-17 (cited in note 1). Of course, all decisions not
to file suit or to dismiss suits preclude the development of information about social conflict.
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the issues to be adjudged. 114 Courts could maintain distinctions be-
tween that which was assumed and that which the court actually
adjudicated-thereby articulating, for purposes of res judicata and
other preclusion doctrines, the reach of the judgments rendered.
But one should not be too quick to dismiss these autonomy-
efficiency claims. We know that consent judgments are sometimes
less expensive-in terms of dollars, time and painl-"5 -to obtain
than are judgments rendered upon adjudication. A refusal to pro-
vide consent decrees would therefore alter the bargaining chips of
the parties-giving more power to those who can afford to use the
threat of court judgment to strategic advantage." 6 Because the in-
dividual or group that initiates a lawsuit holds the trigger to the
threat of litigation and/or of judgment, the current availability of
consent decrees may give advantage to plaintiffs-creditors, prose-
cutors, civil rights claimants, tort victims-rather than to defend-
ants. Plaintiffs (or their lawyers) may be more willing to initiate
suit in a context in which consent decrees are available. Defend-
ants may be more willing to accede to plaintiffs' demands when
faced with a lawsuit. For example, in prison condition cases, politi-
cal concerns may prompt defendant prison administrators to pre-
fer a consent decree, "requiring" them to provide specific kinds of
housing, to a private agreement or to a trial. With such a court
"order," officials may be able to obtain additional funds from legis-
lators or obedience to the agreement from lower level employees." 7
In practice, the impact of strategic advantages will vary de-
pending upon the nature of the suit, the parties, their relative re-
sources, the strength of the underlying legal claims, and the degree
to-which consent decrees actually empower litigants. 18 Some of us
worry that identifiable categories of litigants-the poor, for exam-
ple-are already disadvantaged;" 9 any procedural "reform" that
. 114 For example, conditional guilty pleas narrow the questions to be litigated. See Fed.
Rule Crim. Proc. 11(a)(2).
At the Legal Forum symposium, Burt Neuborne and Frederick Schwarz spoke mov-
ingly about the pain of the fight (among religions and races in New York City) that the
Wilder consent decree sought to avoid.
116 See Mnookin and Kornhauser, 88 Yale L.J. at 951 (cited in note 2).
117 At the Legal Forum symposium, plaintiff civil rights and environmental litigators
were proponents of the continued availability of consent decrees.
1,8 See Note, Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago: Judicial Abandonment of
Consent Decree Principles, 80 Nw. L. Rev. 1675 (1987).
1,9 Frank Michelman has explored some of these problems in the context of whether
filing fees should be required and if so, whether plaintiffs or defendants should be so taxed.
See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to
Protect One's Rights, Part I, 1973 Duke L.J. 1153 (1973).
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further accentuates those disadvantages is to be greeted with sus-
picion.12 Given that many of us have grave doubts about treating
adjudication as an ordinary good 2" and that we know of the disad-
vantages imposed upon those who attempt litigation with limited
resources, we must pause before advocating a regime in which
those already disadvantaged might suffer more.
Moreover, an important theoretical issue lurks beneath the
question of whether parties are engaged in a "charade" or in a
"real" lawsuit. All adjudication is a mixture of decision making by
parties and judges. When filing a complaint, a plaintiff defines the
limits of a court's inquiry. When answering, a defendant narrows
that inquiry further by admitting certain facts or issues. By stipu-
lations of law or fact, the parties may further delimit the arena in
which the judge may speak. Consent decrees may be an extreme on
a continuum but at what moment on that continuum do we decide
that a "sham" adjudication has occurred? Sorting out which activi-
ties are charades and which are the "real thing" is problematic. 122
Living with the tradition of consent decrees avoids the need to
draw new lines.
4. Court Control. Rather than seeing consent decrees as a
technique for validating litigant autonomy, one line of arguments
understands consent decrees to be a tool of the courts to control
parties, who might either conclude litigation by settlements that
do not serve their own, third parties' and/or the public's interest or
who might, once settlements have been achieved, misbehave. Dis-
trust of litigants, assumptions about the symbolic impact of court
involvement, and the need for protection of litigants and the pub-
120 Compare some of the proposals for "tort reform" that would regulate what contin-
gency fee lawyers (who represent plaintiffs) could charge but not what other attorneys could
charge. Reagan Administration Proposal, Product Liability Reform Act of 1986 (on file with
the University of Chicago Legal Forum), discussed in Stephen Gillers, The Real Stakes in
Tort Reform, The Nation 41 (July 19-26, 1986).
"' See Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation With A Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative
Services and The Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1808,
1816 (1986).
122 For example, after a bench trial, a judge may decide to rule for one of the parties
and may direct the parties to file proposed "findings of fact and conclusions of law." See
Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 52(a). Upon occasion, judges adopt a party's submissions in total. The
practice is not typically approved. "The mechanical adoption of a litigant's findings is an
abandonment of the duty imposed on trial judges.., because findings so made fail to 're-
veal the discerning line for decision ... "' Kelson v. United States, 503 F.2d 1291, 1294-95
(10th Cir. 1974) (citation omitted). Compare Anderson v. Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564,
573 (1985) (rejecting the argument that the judge had adopted parties' findings; the decision
was held to be "the judge's own considered conclusions"). On "ghost-written" opinions, see
In re Colony Square Co., 819 F.2d 272 (11th Cir. 1987).
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lic are the bases of these claims.
The concern that litigants will use the power of filing a lawsuit
to the disservice of either their opponents, third parties, or the
public has prompted legal developments that give judges responsi-
bility for dismissal and settlement in certain kinds of cases. Rule
23's requirement that class actions and derivative suits not be dis-
missed without court approval stems, at least in part, from the fear
that "private settlements" might cause harm to the defendant cor-
porations, other shareholders, or other class members. 123 An oft-
stated illustration is a collusive suit that could subsequently pre-
clude future claims.
But is the solution to this problem permitting courts to enter
consent decrees but requiring court approval of those decrees? If
colluding parties had but two options, dismiss the case or try the
case, the court's supervision might not be needed. If the case is
dismissed as to a particular plaintiff, others are not precluded.124
The concern, however, might be that others have relied upon a
first plaintiff's filing and have not themselves pursued claims that
would, due to the dismissal, be time-barred. We could respond to
that problem by a doctrine of linking lawsuits one and two; if the
subsequent litigant can show reasonable reliance and the defend-
ant has been put on notice by virtue of the first lawsuit, the statute
of limitations might be understood to have been tolled by the filing
of the first, timely claim.12 5 Further, if colluding parties make deals
123 The 1938 Advisory Committee Note to Rule 23 cited only to Chester B. McLaugh-
lin, Capacity of Plaintiff-Stockholder to Terminate a Stockholder's Suit, 46 Yale L.J. 421
(1936), and offers no additional explanation of what role was envisioned for the court. See
Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 23 (1938). The McLaughlin article discusses the utility of "stock-
holder" suits and the problems of collusive judgments. Opposing an unrestricted "right" for
derivative plaintiffs, McLaughlin argued that "important reasons of corporate and judicial
policy support a denial to stockholder-plaintiffs of unrestricted power to dispose of corpo-
rate claims." 46 Yale L.J. at 432. Rejecting the option of having all stockholders vote on
dismissals, McLaughlin argued that permission should rest within the "discretion of the
court." Id. at 433. See also James W. Moore and Marcus Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 Ill.
L. Rev. 307, 321-25 (1937); William E. Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stock-
holder Actions-Part I, 22 Sw. L.J. 767, 771 (1968); William E. Haudek, The Settlement and
Dismissal of Stockholder Actions-Part II, 23 Sw. L.J. 765 (1969).
12 Dismissals "on the merits" could prejudice others in cases certified as class actions.
To respond to that problem, one could require that all the dismissals be without prejudice
or could permit subsequent filings if plaintiffs could establish that the first dismissal was
not based upon the best interests of the class. Yet another option is to require notice to
members of the class to ascertain whether volunteers might step forward to continue the
litigation. See Haudek, 22 Sw. L.J. at 785-86.
25 An analogous rule is in place for class actions. See American Pipe & Construction
Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 552-53 (1974) (statute of limitations tolled for all class members
by the filing of a class action complaint). McLaughlin, 46 Yale L.J. at 428 (cited in note
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that might do harm to others to whom the defendant or plaintiff is
obliged, why not let those third parties file suit to invalidate such
agreements? Is court supervision mandated only because, by virtue
of the historic availability of consent decrees, court power can be
enlisted?
If, on the other hand, the concern is that the underlying con-
tract might do harm to third parties or the public,12 then we could
respond by providing judicial supervision of dismissal but not by
authorizing consent decrees. A judge could inquire into the nature
of the dealings between the parties and either grant or deny per-
mission to dismiss the lawsuit. Of course, here we are only policing
the tip of the iceberg; if we are genuinely concerned about con-
tracts that do harm to third parties or fail to comply with societal
norms, we need to inquire into all contracts and not only the small
subset that trigger court attention by the fact of filing.
Moreover, control over dismissal represents a substantial in-
cursion into litigant autonomy. Such an exercise of control would
require a view that, by filing a lawsuit, a party has called for soci-
ety's assistance or claimed that society's rules are broken and that
she or he may not retract that request without society's permis-
sion. 2 7 We do currently have examples of such a conceptualization.
In the federal system, prosecutors may not dismiss criminal cases
without court permission. 2 " The theory is that criminal prosecu-
123), was concerned about the filing of a stockholder suit induced by "fraudulent directors"
who might collude to obtain dismissal at a strategic moment and thereby block "further
action with a plea of the statute of limitations." Id. But see United States v. South Bend
Community School Corp., 710 F.2d 394, 396 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926
(1984) ("As soon as a prospective intervenor knows or has reason to know that his interests
might be adversely affected by the outcome of the litigation he must move promptly to
intervene.") (Posner, J.).
"" Apparently, this was Judge Edelstein's concern when he attempted to block dismis-
sal of the IBM antitrust litigation. The court of appeals reversed, holding that, while the
Tunney Act required judicial approval of consent decrees, no judicial approval was required
when the parties stipulated to dismissals. In re International Business Machines Corp., 687
F.2d 591, 595, 602-03 (2d Cir. 1981). See also Hon. Morris E. Lasker, The Tunney Act Re-
visited: The Role of the Court, 52 A.B.A. Antitrust L.J. 937, 940 (1983) (urging that judicial
approval be required prior to dismissal of antitrust actions). Current law does not always
protect third-party interests. See Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 693 F.2d 133 (1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 900 (1983); Corley v. Jackson Police Department, 755 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir.
1985). See also Douglas Laycock, Consent Decrees Without Consent: The Rights of Non
consenting Third Parties, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 103, 114-116.
127 I do not mean to suggest that the point at which the public interest emerges is
readily identifiable or that the means by which to express the public's interest are obvious.
Far greater exploration of these issues is required; see Judith Resnik, Due Process: A Public
Dimension, in a Conference on Procedural Due Process: Liberty and Justice, 39 U. Fla. L.
Rev. (forthcoming, 1987).
'28 Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 48(a). See Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 30-31 (1977)
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tions implicate us all and that we fear prosecutorial misconduct or
coercion. In practice, however, courts defer to prosecutorial re-
quests for dismissal because courts have little ability to compel a
prosecutor-or any litigant-to continue to litigate a case that she
or he wants to drop.129
Moving from the use of court control to police the filing and
subsequent dismissals of lawsuits to the use of court control to po-
lice the settlement of lawsuits, practices on the criminal side are
again instructive. Defendants are not permitted to plead guilty
without court approval; judges must approve guilty pleas in part
because of the desire to monitor the prosecution, whose powers
and resources far outweigh those of the defense, and in part be-
cause of the fear of defendant incapacity.
But something else is at work as well. Under current practices,
we do not permit parties to enter into contracts that result in the
incarceration of one of them. Thus, on the criminal side, one can
see with clarity an example of a consent decree providing results
beyond that available by contract. The parties do not have the
choices of contract or adjudication that can be functional
equivalents. While the prosecution may "lump it" or make other
deals (for information, diversion, or civil fines), the prosecution
cannot make a deal to imprison. If criminal penalties are desired,
the prosecution can either try the case-or obtain a consent de-
cree. In this sense, the court is needed to impose and to carry out
the sanction; the court is in some sense a party to the contract.
Given this special role of the court in the criminal process, the
case for consent decrees in criminal cases might be the strongest.
Yet it is in the criminal process only-to my knowledge-that the
case for banning consent decrees (or the negotiations that result in
(absent impropriety or motives "clearly contrary to manifest public interest," prosecutors'
motions to dismiss must be granted). See also United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454
(10th Cir. 1985) (rejection of plea bargain, accompanied by proposal to dismiss charges,
under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(e), not appealable pretrial); United States v. Severino, 800
F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 932 (1987) (court may reject guilty pleas
and require trial if acceptance of the plea "would be contrary to the sound administration of
justice"); and United States v. Jackson, 563 F.2d 1145, 1147 (4th Cir. 1977) (court may
refuse guilty plea under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(e)(4)).
12' United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Wood-
ruff v. United States, 425 U.S. 971 (1976) (district court appointment of special prosecutor
to continue prosecution reversed and dismissal accepted). See also United States v. Hamm,
659 F.2d 624 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc); United States v. Dupris, 664 F.2d 169 (8th Cir.
1981). Compare United States v. Krakowitz, 52 F. Supp. 774, 784 (S.D. Ohio 1943) (prosecu-
tor who seeks court "sanction" for nolle prosequi requires "active exercise of the sound
judicial discretion;" the motion was denied as unjustified). See generally Dunlop v. Bachow-
ski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975) (court review of executive decision to bring suit is problematic).
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consent decrees) has been made.130 Opponents of plea bargaining
argue that the system corrupts its participants. Prosecutors charge
that which they cannot prove; defendants are often punished for
either less or for more than they in fact did; judges give discounts
for those who bargain and thereby distort the criminal sanc-
tion-all of which results in the participants and the public under-
standing the criminal justice system as erratic and unprincipled.' 3 '
Underlying such an argument is the premise that adjudication
results in relatively consistent and principled decision making;
many contemporary critics evidence no such faith in the adjudica-
tory process. 132 But one need not arrive at ultimate judgments
about the adjudicatory process to consider the question of elimi-
nating consent decrees on the civil side as well. If we believe that
bargaining gives us judgments either in excess of or less than what
the law would have required, if we know that we reward (with pri-
orities in the litigation queue and elsewhere) those who obtain con-
sent decrees, then we have a comparable problem of erratic and
unprincipled acts passing for adjudication and potentially under-
mining the participants' and the public's respect for the judiciary.
"0 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, No Job Too Small: Justice Without Bargaining in the
Lower Criminal Courts, 1985 Amer. Bar Found. Res. J. 519. In general, the argument made
focuses upon the problems caused by plea bargaining. Critics do not typically direct their
energies towards the issue of whether defendants could confess to judgment or whether the
government must always be put to its proof. But see Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the
Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 931, 950-63 (1983). For sustained arguments against plea bargaining, see Albert W.
Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 652 (1981). Alschuler
suggested in that article that his criticisms of the plea bargaining system need not spill over
to embrace civil settlements. While the civil justice system is primarily a compensation sys-
tem, the criminal justice system has a different goal: to influence conduct through coercion.
Id. at 704-05. In a subsequent article, Alschuler, 99 Harv. L. Rev. at 1808 (cited in note 121),
Professor Alschuler may have enlarged his critique of settlement. Understanding the civil
system as creating useful precedents and discouraging wrongful primary conduct and violent
self-help, Professor Alschuler argued that the high settlement rate in civil cases is to be
deplored because civil litigants settle cases "for the wrong reasons"--the overly-expensive
and too time consuming procedures of the civil courts. Id. at 1816-20.
,' Alschuler, 69 Calif. L. Rev. at 690-93 (cited in note 130); John H. Langbein, Torture
and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 3, 8 (1978). Compare Peter F. Nardulli, Roy B.
Flemming and James Eisenstein, Criminal Courts and Bureaucratic Justice: Concessions
and Consensus in the Guilty Plea Process, 76 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1103, 1128 (1985)
(data from nine counties "suggest that a rather high level of order prevailed in the informal
process through which most felony cases are resolved. Important changes in charges (pri-
mary charge reductions) occurred in only about 15% of the guilty plea cases .. .").
132 Resnik, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 514 (cited in note 107). See also John C. Jeffries, A
Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 Va. L. Rev. 139, 146-47 (1986)
(critique of punitive damage awards by juries); Edmund Mantell, A Probabilistic Assess-
ment of the Incidence of Erroneous Verdicts in Criminal Trials: Theory and Implications, 8
Crim. Just. J. 267 (1986).
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The criticism of the consent decree process on the criminal
side continues beyond the attack on plea bargaining. Many observ-
ers of the criminal justice process claim that the judicial "inquiry"
at guilty plea hearings is a ritual devoid of content. The deal is
made and the formulaic questions are posed without any purpose
other than to insure that the plea will be immune from subsequent
collateral attack. 3 3 Once again, a similar complaint can be made
on the civil side; consent decrees in a variety of cases are adopted
with virtually no genuine inquiry.
The court's role in criminal consent decrees is obvious; a judge
either ratifies the agreement of the prosecution and defense or sets
the terms of the sanction. Some proponents of consent decrees on
the civil side see an analogous role for judges in the compliance
phase of consent decrees. The assumption is that, by entering into
a consent decree (rather than simply stipulating to dismiss a law-
suit), litigants have placed themselves before the court and made
promises to the court as well as to the other parties. The premise
of this court control argument is not that the consent decree signi-
fies cordial settlement but rather that the decree inspires fear. The
"eye" of the court"" is upon the parties.
The problem here is that we need a reason for the court to
turn its eye toward these parties. If no adjudication has occurred,
why should the court care about the promises made in a consent
decree case any more than the court cares about promises made in
general? Is the fact that these litigants have filed but not pursued
their case to conclusion sufficient to support their claim to a prior-
ity in the courthouse queue? Is the fact that the judge has signed
113 McDonald, 70 Judicature at 204 (cited in note 95) ("Despite reforms, the judge's
role in supervising the guilty plea process remains fluid and uncertain."). McDonald's study
reports that the "average time for plea acceptance for all crimes (felony and misdemeanor
cases combined) in all six jurisdictions [El Paso, New Orleans, Seattle, Tucson, Delaware
County and Norfolk] is 7.8 minutes." Id. at 206. A total of 711 pleas were observed. Id. See
also, Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 Colum. L.
Rev. 1059, 1065 (1976); People v. Mroczko, 35 Cal. 3d 86, 114, 672 P.2d 835 (1983) (separate
counsel for co-defendants is needed because court inquiries into conflicts may be only to
protect the record). Nardulli, et al. note the difficulties lower courts face in the plea bargain-
ing process. "[T]heir mission is so undefined and their technology is so uncertain... ." 76 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology at 1131 (cited in note 131).
Compare the requirements in federal courts, discussed in United States v. Allen, 804
F.2d 244 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1384 (1987) (reversing an inadequate Rule
11(f) inquiry); United States v. Darling, 766 F.2d 1095 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 579 (1985) (Rule 11(f) inquiry insufficient); United States v. Fountain, 777 F.2d 351 (7th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1232 (1986) (inadequate judicial inquiry).
134 Sierra Baptista, De Iusticia Pingenda (On the Painting of Justice) (trans. and notes
by James Wardrop, London, 1957) (Does one depict Justice with one eye or many eyes?).
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their agreement sufficient to pledge the court to provide its re-
sources to enforce that agreement? One response is that, by filing a
lawsuit, a plaintiff asserts some claim to society's resources to as-
sist in the vindication of rights. We may well want to reward the
voluntary relinquishment of a claim on society's resources by a
promise of future assistance-if and when the need arises.
Further, a judicial signature on a consent decree could-at
least in theory-signify a modicum of genuine judicial involvement
in the formulation of a contract. Returning to the typology of the
consent decree process described earlier, the two variants involving
judicial control of the agreement provide some basis for judicial
validation. If the judge negotiates the settlement or if the judge
makes qualitative judgments about the settlement at the time of
its entry, then the court's seal of approval could provide a basis for
the subsequent benefits conferred. Moreover, to the extent that the
parties' ability to contract is derived from the court-as in the case
of guilty pleas used to impose criminal sanctions and in class ac-
tions-the court may have a special stake in the contracts made.
Hence, the claim for offering consent decrees may be at its strong-
est in cases, such as criminal cases, class actions or other kinds of
group litigation (including when the government is a party), in
which there are questions about the authority of the representa-
tives to bind the aggregation of interests avowedly represented. 135
Take the criminal context first. The court has a defined inter-
est in the contract between the prosecutor and the defendant be-
cause that contract is the basis upon which the court imposes sen-
tence. As noted, the judge may be conceptualized as almost a party
to the contract-carrying out the terms of the parties' contract.
But the judge has an independent interest, because the judge is
empowered by the state to punish. The judicial license to punish is
predicated upon the imposition of punishment only on those who
have broken the law. Further, since the state may use the parties'
agreement to deprive individuals of property as well as of liberty,
the state may have an additional interest in the propriety of the
agreements made. Finally, one of the parties to the contract is the
government itself; some concern about appropriate use of the
power to prosecute underlies the role of the court in consensual
agreements in criminal cases.
Given these many state interests in these kinds of contracts,
... Professor Coffee analyzes this as a problem of client inability to control en-
treprenurial lawyers. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as
Monitor of Shareholder Litigation, 48 L. & Contemp. Probs. 76-77 (Summer 1985).
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we might insist upon proof of the facts upon which they depend. In
the federal system, we have instead opted for a less demanding
requirement-that the prosecutor articulate to the judge the fac-
tual basis for the plea and that the defendant acknowledge aware-
ness of the alternative to pleading guilty. In federal court, the trial
judge is supposed to be told enough to establish the defendant's
guilt.13 6 Further, in both federal and state courts, the judge is sup-
posed to inquire about whether the defendant was informed of the
rights to trial by jury, of the prosecution's burden of proof, and of
the possible consequences that may flow from the guilty plea."'7
(We do not, as a matter of constitutional law, demand that the
individual to be punished admit to the crime.138) We take the
court's "acceptance" of the guilty plea to represent a judicial de-
termination that the parties had the capacity to and did in fact
consent. Thus, in theory, acceptance of guilty pleas posits an adju-
dicatory role for judges.
The class action and certain kinds of statutory claims provide
other examples of lawsuits in which the set of alternatives is di-
minished because private negotiations cannot bring about results
that mirror those that might be provided by court order. Just as
136 The requirement of a factual basis.is one imposed on federal, but not state, courts.
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971). Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(f) states that
"the court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall
satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea." What is meant in practice varies. For
example, in United States v. Johnson, 546 F.2d 1225, 1226 (5th Cir. 1977), the court re-
quired a factual basis "precise enough and sufficiently specific to show that the accused's
conduct on the occasion involved was within the ambit of that defined as criminal.... [T]he
district court must insure that the conduct admitted by the accused constitutes the offense
charged...." See also United States v. Boatright, 588 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 1979) (......
each essential element of the crime charge [must] be shown"), and United States v. Darling,
766 F.2d 1095, 1100 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[tlhe conduct admitted [did not] constitute the offence
... charged"). On the other hand, much is left to the trial judge's "subjective satisfaction."
United States v. Dayton, 604 F.2d 931, 938 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980)
(analyzing Rule 11 in general, including Rule 11(f)). The standard of proof and the degree of
specificity required is unclear. For discussion of both state and federal requirements, see
Wayne LaFave and Gerold Israel, 2 Criminal Procedure § 20.4(f) at 652-55 (1984) (com-
menting that the requirement of a factual basis may be explained as further substantiation
that a plea is made voluntarily and knowingly) and Sanford H. Kadish, Stephen J.
Schulhofer, and Monrad G. Paulsen, Criminal Law and Its Processes 167-68 (4th ed. 1983).
137 Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(f) requires a factual basis; 11(c) requires inquiry into the
voluntariness of the plea and the state of mind of the defendant, as well as the provision of
information on the consequences of the plea. Most of these inquiries are constitutionally
mandated. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 460 (1969); Henderson v. Morgan,
426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969); and North Carolina
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970).
138 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. at 38 (court may accept a guilty plea of a defend-
ant who claims that he did not commit the offense as long as there is a factual basis for the
plea).
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our rules do not currently permit a prosecutor and a criminal de-
fendant to bargain for imprisonment, a few individuals cannot
bind the members of the class that they hoped to represent.' e Per-
haps arguments analogous to those made on the criminal side can
be marshalled in support of genuine judicial involvement in civil
consent decrees.
If a consent decree is entered, the state will provide its re-
sources to enforce the rights and obligations created; the state will
use the parties' agreements to shift assets or to insist upon a
course of behavior. As in the criminal context, the litigants who
consent to judgment waive a packet of rights, of opportunities pro-
vided by the government to have the dispute adjudged in a pre-
scribed manner. Perhaps with these concerns in mind, the Su-
preme Court, in its recent discussion of consent decrees, set out a
task for judges that parallels the kind of inquiry supposedly made
in the guilty plea context. Recall that Local Number 93 states that,
prior to the entry of a consent decree, a judge must ascertain
whether: (1) a decree is within the general scope of the pleadings;
(2) the decree furthers the "objectives" of the law under which the
case was filed; and (3) the decree requires no action in violation of
the statute. 140
If, in fact, judges were to undertake an analysis of a proposed
decree to determine these three issues, then judicial endorsements
of contracts could constitute quasi-adjudicative judgments. After
the receipt of the requisite information, after exploration of the
meaning of the law and the nature of the proposal, the court could
reach a judgment about the proposal. The court could determine
that a proposed decree fulfills the mandates of the law. If judges
were to render such judgments, then the contracts entered into by
consent decree would be more readily distinguished from the con-
19 Similarly, parties to an ordinary contract may not be able to obtain specific per-
formance of their agreement. See Schwartz, 89 Yale L.J. at 271 (cited in note 77).
140 Local Number 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3077. Note that this inquiry does not forbid a con-
sent decree from going beyond the requirements of the law. Id. The ambiguity is whether
providing significantly less than the law requires would suffice to further the "objectives" of
the statute involved. A further question is whether the Court's comments in Local Number
93, which seem to be a quite general discussion of consent decrees, are appropriately limited
to cases brought under federal statutes or, more narrowly, under Title VII. Note also that
courts have declined to enforce consent decrees that go beyond the requirements of consti-
tutional law. See, for example, Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1985) (declining to
enforce a prohibition on double bunking of prisoners in a local facility). But see Morris v.
Travisono, 499 F. Supp. 149, 157 (D.R.I. 1980) (refusal to modify prison consent decree to
reduce defendant's obligations absent a showing of grievous injury to the defendant). Such
decrees may only be of help when both parties continue voluntarily to obey them.
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tracts made without the court's imprimatur. The court would have
adjudicated some of the issues in the case, thus providing some
justification for the subsequent priorities and special treatment ac-
corded consent decrees.
A strong set of parallels can be drawn between criminal cases
and one kind of civil consent decree, the class action. Like criminal
cases, many class action litigants do not have the two alternatives
of full adjudication or private accord. While corporations, unions,
and other groups who litigate have identities beyond the court-
house, many groups denominated as a "class" exist as entities only
because a court has said so. The purchasers of a brand of blue
jeans, the customers of hotels that place additional charges on tele-
phone calls, the past, current, and future inmates 'of a
prison-none partake of an organization that can speak for them.
The group can contract only after a court decides that a represen-
tative who has stepped forward has shown sufficient diligence and
adequacy to be heard and that the group shares sufficient com-
monality to function as a group-at least in relationship to a spe-
cific adversary. Thus, in class actions as in criminal cases, no bar-
gain can be made without court involvement.
One problem, however, in both criminal and civil contexts, is
that such judgments-about the continued propriety of the class as
a bargaining unit, about the factual basis of a plea or the congru-
ence between a statute's objectives and a proposed course of con-
duct-require information. The people to whom courts normally
turn for information are the parties. Courts have traditionally been
skeptical of information provided by partisans. To validate the
facts or law presented, courts have relied upon the adversary pos-
ture of the parties, who, when in conflict, have incentives to pro-
vide courts with a range of data that judges in turn evaluate. When
both parties want either guilty pleas or civil consent decrees to be
entered, neither has any incentive to offer information to contra-
dict the propriety of entry of the decree. The court's information
base is constricted.141
A second problem is that judges understand that their pros-
pects are small for compelling parties to litigate cases that the par-
ties do not want to pursue. The tradition of deferring to
prosecutorial and agency discretion and declining to mandate pros-
ecutions and agency enforcement proceedings is based, in part,
upon the assumption that courts can rarely succeed in compelling
141 Compare Langbein, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 824 (cited in note 76) (in civil law coun-
tries, the court takes an active role in collecting information).
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litigation.142 As a consequence, the federal criminal rule that prose-
cutors may not dismiss cases without court permission has resulted
in case law granting prosecutors the permission to dismiss. When a
rare district judge has denied that permission, appellate courts
have reversed. 43
In sum, upon an evaluation of the several rationales for con-
sent decrees, some skepticism of and some support for the proce-
dure emerges. We have scant empirical bases for claiming that con-
sent decrees reduce court dockets or achieve greater compliance
than would be the case in a world without consent decrees. We do
know that, in some instances, consent decrees are a less expensive
means by which to obtain a judgment, and we also know that, in
an identifiable category of cases, private accords cannot provide
full substitutes for that which courts order. Because there is no
private alternative, parties to such disputes are faced with seeking
adjudication, obtaining consent decrees or having no mechanism
by which to change behavior or claim redress. Court control, flexi-
bility, and autonomy have some appeal. But to say that a court is
needed in some instances is not to decide the question of whether
consent decrees ought to be offered in all cases. Nor is the way in
which judges might carry out their role clear. To consider this as-
pect of the problem, further understanding of the role of the court
in approving consent decrees is required. Given that a court's par-
ticipation may be required, what form does, could, and should that
participation take?
IV. CONSENT DECREES AND ADJUDICATION
The tradition-at least up until recently-has been for judges
to do little when entering consent decrees. Variant I was the mode,
with judges performing ministerial acts. To enter a consent decree
was not to adjudicate. In contrast, the tradition in adjudication has
been for the court to engage, for judges to render principled rulings
142 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (deference to prosecutorial discre-
tion and describing a "presumption" of nonreviewability of agency decisions not to com-
mence enforcement proceedings). Compare Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975);
Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (reviewing agency decisions
to decline to commence enforcement proceedings). Separation of powers doctrine also influ-
ences court reticence in this area.
See, for example, United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1975). Judges may
also refuse to enter guilty pleas. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128
U. Pa. L. Rev. 733, 733-78 (1980) (the case for judicial control over pleas is more persuasive
than judicial control over dismissals-in part because the sentencing authority of courts is
at stake).
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based upon independent judgments made in light of the informa-
tion provided by the parties. As a consequence of that principled
decision making, lives and behavior change.'
In this section, I ask whether wielding court power is appropri-
ate in instances when judges do not adjudicate but rather act with-
out thought. But as a predicate to that question, I examine
whether the entry of consent decrees intrinsically demands judicial
action without thought or whether some form of adjudication
might be incorporated into the consent decree process. I will con-
sider whether we might bend the traditions to develop a mixed
form: a bit of consent and a bit of adjudication. Such a mixed form
might be evolving; one could understand the recent Supreme Court
pronouncements, such as Local Number 93 and some of the deci-
sions of the last decades, as requiring judicial control predicated
upon some kind of adjudication, as moving us towards Variants II
and III of the typology. The questions are whether judicial involve-
ment is possible and, if so, whether it can validate the practice of
offering consent decrees. Note again that these questions about the
role of judges do not decide the ultimate issue of the propriety or
utility of having consent decrees. Commentators in this symposium
have addressed other aspects of the consent judgment process and
may have strong claims upon which to legitimate or to condemn
it.' 45
Below, I examine one kind of case, class actions, in which
judges seem to have taken a greater role in assessing consent de-
crees than in other fields. 146 Looking at the law and practice pro-
14 As Bob Cover so well reminds us. See Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale
L.J. 1601 (1986).
"I See sources cited in note 1.
'4' As noted, there are a few other areas in which courts must undertake analogous
inquiries. See, for example, the approval of bankruptcy reorganizations, 11 U.S.C. § 1129
1982; court review of agency approval of rate increases, discussed in United Municipal Dis-
tributors Group v. F.E.R.C., 732 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1984); dismissal or compromise of cases
involving immigration prosecutions, 8 U.S.C. § 1329 1982; shareholder derivative actions,
under Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 23.1 (discussed in Coffee, 48 L. & Contemp. Probs., Summer at
26-33 (cited in note 135). See also, the Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) 1982, discussed in
United States v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 143-47 (D.D.C. 1982), sum-
marily aff'd sub nom, Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); Note, Judicial Re-
view of Antitrust Consent Decrees: Reconciling Judicial Responsibility with Executive Dis-
cretion, 35 Hast. L.J. 133, 134 (1983); Note, The Scope of Judicial Review of Consent
Decrees Under the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 153,
153-55 (1983). District court disapproval of Justice Department proposals is rare; see Eric J.
Branfman, Antitrust Consent Decrees-A Review and Evaluation of tle First Seven Years
under the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 1982 Antitrust Bull. 303, 328, 354 (act
had "no substantive effect in the majority of cases"); United States v. GTE Corp., 603 F.
Supp. 730 (D.D.C. 1984) (Greene, J). For discussion of agency decision making when achiev-
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vides some insight into the feasibility of demanding that, in addi-
tion to a judicial "act," there be judicial "judgment" of consent
decrees. The questions are whether judges in fact do something ad-
judicatory when determining to accept or reject class actiofi con-
sent decrees, and if so, whether that mode could be adapted to
other types of lawsuits. Further, I consider whether the increasing
judicial role in the negotiation of the agreements that form the ba-
sis for consent decrees assists or confuses the task of judicial ap-
proval of consent decrees. Finally, I return to the underlying issue:
the quality of judicial involvement in consent decrees.
A. Approving Consent Decrees in Class Actions
Rule 23(e) states only that class actions cannot be "dismissed
or compromised without court approval.114 7 No text specifies the
criteria that judges are to use to determine whether or not to give
their approval.'48 The lower courts have, however, developed a sub-
stantial body of case law addressing that issue. The question arises
in one of two contexts. Either a district judge approves a class set-
tlement and dissidents object and appeal, 49 or a district judge de-
clines to approve a class action and the parties seek to overturn
that decision.150 The Supreme Court has never delineated a unitary
approach to the issue, and there is some variation among the cir-
cuits,' 51 but guidelines-shaped by case law and the Manual for
ing settlements, see Michael J. Zimmer and Charles A. Sullivan, Consent Decree Settle-
ments by Administrative Agencies in Antitrust and Employment Discrimination: Optimiz-
ing Public and Private Interests, 1976 Duke L.J. 163.
M' Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 23(e).
148 The rule does state that "notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be
given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs." Id. As noted, the
Advisory Committee's original discussion of this provision was cryptic and made reference
only to the McLaughlin article. See note 123. Although the rule was substantially revised in
1966, no alteration (other than the notice provision and renumbering) was made to this
section, and no explanation (other than a reference to the need for court approval) was
provided in the accompanying notes. See the 1966 amendments. Leaving the matter simply
to judicial discretion fits within the suggestions of the McLaughlin article. The expansive
role for judges is also consistent with Professor Steve Subrin's thesis that the 1938 Federal
Rules were drafted, in part, to rely upon judicial "expertise" to shape the procedures as
needed. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909 (1987).
4 ' See, for example, Armstrong v. Board of School Directors of the City of Milwaukee,
616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980).
See, for example, Plummer v. Chemical Bank, 668 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1982).
Compare Malchman v. Davis, 706 F.2d 426, 433 (2d Cir. 1983), subsequent history at
761 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1798 (1986) ("[W]e do expect [district
court judges] to explore the facts sufficiently to make intelligent determinations of adequacy
and fairness .... and we have strongly hinted that making findings of fact and conclusions
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Complex Litigation' 52-are generally consistent. A class action
consent decree is to be approved only if it is "fair, adequate, and
reasonable."' 3
When determining whether or not to approve a class action,
the cases and the Manual state, a trial judge is not to adjudicate
the merits of the lawsuit.154 Nor is the judge to substitute her or
his judgment for that of the parties.15  The views of counsel, who
negotiated the agreement, are entitled to deference.'56 But the
judge is not to act as a "rubber stamp.' 57 The judge must make an
independent determination of the adequacy of the settlement.'58
One commentator described this process as "active but
nonadjudicatory."' 59
"Fair, adequate, and reasonable" are often used ambiguously
in these cases. Some judges translate this formula as requiring an
inquiry into the adequacy of the consent. Such an inquiry mirrors
the traditional questions for a court confronted with a consent de-
cree. 60 Given the peculiar nature of a class action, the question of
of law whenever the propriety of the settlement is seriously in dispute is desirable." (cita-
tions omitted)); Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir. 1977) ("A threshold require-
ment is that the trial judge undertake an analysis of the facts and the law relevant to the
proposed compromise."); with Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 920 (6th Cir. 1983) ("The
Court has no occasion to determine the merits of the controversy or the factual underpin-
nings of the legal authorities advanced by the parties.").
152 Manual for Complex Litigation, Second, § 30.4 et seq. at 235-48 (West 1985). Note
that this standard is also used when courts approve Title VII consent decrees, although
some courts accord presumptive validity to decrees proposed by a government agency. See,
for example, United States v. City of Miami, Fla., 664 F.2d 435, 440 (5th Cir. 1981) (en
banc), quoting United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358, 1362 (5th Cir. 1980). For
discussion of judicial practice during the first few years after the 1966 amendments to Rule
23, see Richard F. Dole, Jr., The Settlement of Class Actions for Damages, 71 Colum. L.
Rev. 971 (1971).
1"' Manual for Complex Litigation § 30.44 at 242.
154 Id., § 30.41 at 237.
115 Armstrong, 616 F.2d at 315; Cotton, 559 F.2d at 1326.
116 "[A] presumption of correctness is said to attach to a class settlement reached in
arms-length negotiations between experienced, capable counsel. .-. ." Manual for Complex
Litigation § 30.41 at 237 (cited in note 152).
"I' Id., § 30.41 at 236 ("Court review must not be perfunctory; it is not a ministerial
function."). See also In re Traffic Executive Ass'n-Eastern Railroads, 627 F.2d 631, 633 (2d
Cir. 1980); and Haudek, 23 Sw. L.J. at 801-03 (cited in note 123) (approval of settlements of
stockholder actions should be based not upon the merits but upon the court's "informed
business judgment of the adequacy of the compromise"). See also Mnookin and Kornhauser,
88 Yale L.J. at 953-56 (judges "rubber stamp" divorce agreements) (cited in note 2).
5 Cotton, 559 F.2d at 1330 ("boiler-plate approval" is inadequate).
Lloyd C. Anderson, The Approval and Interpretation of Consent Decrees in Civil
Rights Class Action Litigation, 1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. 579, 588-89.
1o These questions parallel the limited questions supposed to have been asked when
courts entered consent decrees in the non-class action context. See In re Director of Insur-
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the sufficiency of consent is more complex here than in other law-
suits. The judicial task is to learn whether those seeking settlement
are in fact representative-hence capable of binding themselves
and the class they represent-and whether the class may be
deemed to have consented to be so bound. If a court answers both
questions in the affirmative, then the consent decree might be seen
as "fair, adequate, and reasonable."
If class action consent decree approvals are understood as
making only these judgments, then one could describe the consent
decree judgment as a reaffirmation of the court's initial determina-
tion that the action could be maintained as a class action.161 The
court insures that the class representatives have not benefitted
from the agreement to the detriment of other class members, that
the representatives, initially certified as "adequate" and "typi-
cal, 1 1 2 have discharged their tasks properly and furthered the in-
terests of the class. The court also reexamines the structure of the
class and the procedures by which the representatives propose to
bind the class to an agreement."'3
The other meaning of "fair, adequate, and reasonable" looks
beyond the question of consent to evaluate the merits of the settle-
ment-to determine whether the settlement itself is "fair, ade-
quate, and reasonable." Here, the judgment of sufficiency must be
based upon something other than a reappraisal of the capacity of a
class representative entering into a contract on behalf of the class.
Here, the judge must determine that the contract itself is a fair
deal.16 4
ance, 141 Neb. 488, 496, 3 N.W.2d 922, 926 (1942).
161 Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 23(c) requires that the court determine whether the action can
be maintained as a class action and so certify.
162 See Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 23(a).
163 See, for example, In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litigation, 594
F.2d 1106, 1125-32 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979). Under this model, the
court serves "as the guardian of the interests of the absent members of the class." Liebman
v. J.W. Petersen Coal & Oil Co., 73 F.R.D. 531, 534 (N.D. Ill. 1973). Even after judgment,
courts remain somewhat skeptical of the adequacy of representation; a few courts have de-
clined to give res judicata effect to class action judgments subsequently attacked on the
grounds of inadequacy of the representation. See, for example, Johnson v. General Motors
Corp., 598 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1979) and Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Application of Preclusion
Principles to § 1983 Damage Actions After a Successful Class Action for Equitable Relief, 17
Val. U.L. Rev. 347 (1983).
264 McLaughlin, 46 Yale L.J. at 433-34 (cited in note 123) raised the two possible kinds
of review that a court might provide-either to inquire into whether the purported repre-
sentatives of the corporation were acting in the corporation's interests or "after examining
all the circumstances, [to] reach an independent decision on the fairness of the settlement."
Id. See also Note, Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need for a Guardian
During Pretrial Settlement Negotiations, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 308, 321-325 (1985) (conceptual-
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Not only is the case law somewhat ambiguous 65 about which
kind of sufficiency is meant, the two kinds of sufficiency are not
always distinct. That is, one way to determine whether a represen-
tative of a class has discharged the obligations of that office is to
review the merits of the agreement made. When judges review
class action consent decrees on their merits, they do not generally
indicate whether the review is intended solely for the purpose of
determining the adequacy of the consent or whether the review is
aimed at rendering judgment on the quality of the settlements
reached.
Do we have a richer rhetoric around judicial behavior in class
actions as compared with the ritualistic incantations at many
guilty pleas' but with the same outcome-that the parties' agree-
ments are almost always approved?1 7 The case law and commen-
izing the judge's role as engaging in a "substantive inquiry" into the "fairness of the negoti-
ated settlement" and a "procedural inquiry" into whether class members object to the
settlement).
Note that some circuits require judges not to "decide unsettled legal questions." Arm-
strong v. Board of Sch. Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 320 (7th Cir. 1980). Hence the quality of the
agreement is presumably not measured by what the law would have "required," although
sometimes judicial discussions suggest the opposite. See, for example, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 373, 375
(D. Kan. 1971).
161 See, for example, Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123-24
(8th Cir. 1975) (the court acts as a "fiduciary" to the class to decide if the settlement is fair,
adequate and reasonable; inquiry as to adequacy requires only that the agreement not be
illegal per se. The objectors' claim of the "alleged illegality of the settlement is not a legal
certainty."). See also In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740
(E.D.N.Y 1984)) (settlement is "fair"-but to whom?), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 818
F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987); Anderson, 1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 600 (cited in note 159).
161 The image of guilty pleas as superficial, ritualistic inquiries derives from the state
courts, in which the vast majority of pleas are taken. See McDonald, 70 Judicature at 211
(cited in note 95). In contrast, it appears that at least on direct appeal, the federal appellate
courts exercise some supervision of the trial bench's implementation of Fed. Rule Crim.
Proc. ll's requirements. See cases cited in notes 133 and 136. As a consequence, federal
judges' roles in guilty pleas may come closer to adjudication than to ritual. However, as
discussed in text at notes 179-186, aspects of class actions provide greater opportunities for
the development of information and thus enable more adjudicatory behavior than guilty
pleas.
,17 McLaughlin saw the potential problem:
"Discretion of the court" is all too frequently the solution proposed for a difficult
problem.... Judicial supervision appears to be the best possible means of protect-
ing the rights of other stockholders .... absent parties with definite and substan-
tial interests at stake. True, when a proposed compromise is laid before the court,
it is in effect being asked to make a finding on the merits... without the thorough
investigation of facts supposed to characterize trials. But some legal mechanism
for compromising a derivative action must be provided ....
McLaughlin, 46 Yale L.J. at 435 (cited in note 123). See also Pettway v. American Cast Iron
Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1169 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979) (reviewing
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tary suggest that judges deciding the question of class action con-
sent decrees often go through a more elaborate process that
provides appellate courts (and therefore the public) with more in-
formation than do judges when accepting guilty pleas.168
Under the mandates of Rule 23, the case law, and the Manual
for Complex Litigation, judges typically scrutinize proposed de-
crees to ascertain whether the decrees are within the ballpark of
approval. " If settlement proposals are facially adequate, the
courts issue notice to the members of the class that hearings will
be conducted on the propriety of judicial approval.7 0 Proponents
and objectors are given the opportunity to make their claims, and
then courts state reasons for approval or disapproval of the de-
crees.17 1 Judges do not automatically disapprove of those decrees
that inspire class members-including the named plaintiffs-to ob-
ject, 7 2 nor do judges unreflectively approve of those decrees to
which there is no active opposition.17 3 Perhaps most importantly,
approval and denial of the entry of consent decrees are often ap-
class action settlement proposals is a twilight zone in which, without "a fully developed
evidentiary record, both the trial ... and appellate court" are less capable "of making the
independent assessment of the facts and law required in the adjudicatory context").
168 See generally Anderson, 1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 592-615 (cited in note 159).
169 Without a review of the docket sheets in specific cases, we cannot know how often
judges refuse proposed settlements at that point.
170 Courts have not required hearings in all instances. Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 23(e) states
only that "notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of
the class in such manner as the court directs." The Manual for Complex Litigation provides
suggestions for the notice. See Manual for Complex Litigation 2d § 30.212 at 225-26 (cited
in note 152). The ABA's proposed modification of the rule would permit the court to dis-
pense with notice under certain circumstances. ABA Proposed Revisions of Rule 23, 110
F.R.D. at 203 (cited in note 60).
7 Appellate courts require such detail when determining whether to affirm; many cir-
cuits have an "abuse of discretion" standard. See, for example, Flinn v. FMC Corporation,
528 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976); In re Traffic Executive
Ass'n.-Eastern Railroads, 627 F.2d at 633.
172 Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d at 1174 (three of the named plaintiffs objected but
settlement approval upheld). The presence of objecting class members is "relevant" but
"not dispositive," even when many object. Armstrong, 616 F.2d at 326. See also Bryan v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. (PPG Industries, Inc.), 494 F.2d 799, 803 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 900 (1974). One might be tempted by a per se rule that the presence of objectors
requires disapproval; such a rule would simplify the inquiry and would locate it squarely on
the question of consent. However, the utility of class action litigation might be greatly di-
minished. For commentary arguing that objectors lack sufficient information to raise sophis-
ticated complaints and therefore fail to provide adequate information to courts, see Haudek,
23 Sw. L.J. at 805 (cited in note 123); Note, 84 Mich. L. Rev. at 325-32 (cited in note 164)
(advocating the appointment of a "guardian ad litem" for the class).
173 See, for example, In re Traffic Executive Ass'n-Eastern Railroads, 627 F.2d at 634.
A small number of objections is used, however, as part of a justification for approval. See
Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d at 1174.
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pealable immediately. 17 4 Appellate oversight of trial judges has re-
sulted in the trial bench explaining, in some detail, the reasons for
entry or disapproval of consent decrees. 175
Thus, when considering consent decrees in class actions, many
judges do appear to be applying at least a loose set of principles to
facts in specific cases. The case law suggests that, while in some
cases, the inquiry is superficial, in other instances judges go be-
yond the perfunctory. 17  Further, although the guidelines for ap-
proval are open-textured, some doctrinal constraints have
emerged. 77 Some proposed consent decrees are found wanting and
are disapproved. When reviewing a class action consent decree,
trial judges might be described as adjudicating something-either
the sufficiency of the consent or the sufficiency of the settlement
itself. An abbreviated adjudicatory form appears to be in place in
some of the reported decisions.7 8
174 Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981) (approval of consent decrees
provides a final judgment, appealable as of right under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Disapproval of the
consent decree, if that decree involves an injunction, is appealable as of right under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)). In cases without injunctions, appealability as of right is less clear. See
New York v. Dairylea Co-Op., Inc., 698 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1983) (no appeal permitted), and
the discussion by Posner, J. in Donovan v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170, 1172-76 (7th Cir. 1985).
175 See, for example, Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 159 (3d Cir. 1975) (insufficient sup-
port in the record for approval of settlement).
176 See, for example, Costello v. Wainwright, 489 F. Supp. 1100, 1101 (M.D. Fla. 1980)
(limited discussion of inquiry). Compare, In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation,
659 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1012 (1982) (reviewing detailed findings
of district court); Franks v. Kroger Co., 649 F.2d 1216 (6th Cir. 1981) (reversing class action
approval). The problem is how courts are to "make an intelligent comparison between the
amount of the compromise and the probable recovery" (In re Traffic Executive-Eastern
Railroads, 627 F.2d at 633) without trying the case. Circuits have developed case law stan-
dards on approval related to the particular kind of decree under review. One might antici-
pate the degree of judicial consideration varying with the nature of the underlying claim.
177 See, for example, Malchman v. Davis, 706 F.2d at 434 (district court record inade-
quate to support approval of settlement); In re General Motors Corp., Engine Interchange
Lit., 594 F.2d 1106, 1124-27 (7th Cir. 1979) (consent decree approval reversed; district court
erred when forbidding discovery into the negotiations with the subclass and failed to explore
the issue of the adequacy of representation).
178 A few caveats are appropriate. The Second Circuit, for example, requires district
courts to compare "the substantive terms of the settlement ... [with] the likely result of a
trial" and to assess the fairness of the "negotiating process." Malchman v. Davis, 706 F.2d
at 433. Judicial construction of the "likely result of a trial" is, by definition, highly specula-
tive because judges are not permitted to hold trials to decide that question. The degree of
uncertainty will vary with the nature of the case and the timing of the settlement. As a
consequence, I want to underscore the limits of the decisions made. See also Coffee, 48 L. &
Contemp. Probs., Summer at 30-32 (cited in note 135) (narrow role played by court in ap-
proval of shareholder derivative actions because of unwillingness of court to compel litiga-
tion of complex cases that parties do not want to pursue); Note, 84 Mich. L. Rev. at 325-32
(cited in note 164) (urging additional safeguards because current procedures are inadequate
to insure fairness to class members). For further discussion of the impact of decrees on class
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B. Generalizing The Adjudicatory Form
Assuming that judicial approval of consent decrees in fact rep-
resents adjudication of a sort (rather than a ritualistic dance), the
next question is whether that mode of decision making could or
should be adopted in areas other than class actions. I believe the
answer is probably not-for several reasons.
First, and most importantly, in many proposed class action
consent decrees, members of the class object. Unlike instances in
which all the voices before the court are urging the entry of a con-
sent decree, in class actions, adversarial litigants challenge the pro-
priety of a decree's entry. Objectors provide a source of informa-
tion that would be otherwise lacking.
Second, class actions are a statistical rarity on the federal
court docket; fewer than one percent of the cases filed in 1985 were
class actions. 179 As a consequence, each federal judge has (at most)
only a few of these cases.180 Further, class actions often involve
substantial sums of money or major legal questions. The money or
the issues attract lawyers, who often have experience in the area
and who have track records of which judges may be aware. The
combination of low frequency, substantial resources, and high visi-
bility might well engender special treatment of these
cases-treatment that would (and perhaps could) not be provided
if required over a greater percentage of judges' caseloads. 81
Third, in many class actions, attorneys for the class return to
the trial judge for approval of fees.'82 Trial judges have approached
members and third parties, see Laycock, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. at 113-121 (cited in note
126). Finally, when intervention is permitted, trial judges have discretion to shape the roles
permitted to intervenors. See Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 107 S. Ct.
1177 (1987).
M Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts 166 (1985) ("1985 Annual Report"). In 1985, 273,670 civil actions were filed; .4 %
(971 cases) were class actions. In contrast, in 1976, 2.7% (3,584 cases of a total of 130,597
cases) were denominated class actions at filing. Id.
180 Class actions are not evenly distributed. In 1985, 89 were filed in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, while 1 was filed in the District of Utah. Id., table 135 at 167.
"'1 In 1985, 48.2% of the cases terminated were disposed of with "no court action." Id.,
table 29 at 158. 4.7% reached trial. Id. It has been estimated that some 35% of the court
docket requires federal judges to adjudicate some disputed (but not necessarily dispositive)
issue. Conversation with member of the staff of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts (Spring 1985).
18 More than 100 federal statutes permit fee shifting. See generally Report of the
Third Circuit Task Force, Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237 (1985), for discus-
sion of methods by which judges are to decide fees. In addition to the statutory bases for fee
shifting, federal courts may order that all members of the plaintiff class contribute to the
fees under the "common benefit/common fund" theory. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
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that task with care and have not always granted the sums re-
quested. 18 3 The lawyers involved in class settlements have a great
incentive to appear responsible, to demonstrate the adequacy of
their settlement proposals and their fidelity to the interests of the
class they represent. Further, dissident class members, if repre-
sented by counsel, may also have lawyers who hope to share in the
subsequent award of fees. 1 4 Thus, on both sides of some battles
over proposed consent decrees, counsel may have the fiscal where-
withal and the economic, ideological, or reputational investment to
provide a good deal of information to the court." 5
Fourth, in some class actions, the question of approval arises
after a substantial amount of litigation and adjudication has oc-
curred. As a consequence, the judge who determines the adequacy
of the decree may have ample information about the lawsuit. In-
deed, in some instances, liability has already been adjudicated, and
the parties negotiate the decree within the parameters established
by the court.8 6
In sum, the ability of judges to adjudicate something in class
action settlements depends upon the presence of some or all of
these factors: objectors willing to provide information; judicial
time, interest, and energy to examine proposals with care; lawyers
Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975).
183 The Supreme Court has recently approved part of that methodology. See Pennsyl-
vania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 106 S. Ct. 3088 (1986). After rear-
gument, the court addressed the question of the use of "multipliers" or enhancements of
hourly fees in recognition of the risk of loss and held that, under the Clean Air Act, the
lower court should not have augmented the fee as it did. 107 S. Ct. 3078 (1987).
184 See Frankenstein v. McCrory Corp., 425 F. Supp. 762, 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (attor-
neys for objectors were awarded fees because they "transformed the settlement hearing into
a truly adversary proceeding" that enabled the court to analyze the settlement and thus
conferred a benefit on the class). Compare United States Trust Co. of New York v. Execu-
tive Life Ins. Co., 602 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (applying Frankenstein standard, no
fees awarded to objectors' attorneys).
'" The objectors may nonetheless be hampered in many respects. In some cases, the
lawyers representing objectors may have participated in settlement negotiations; in other
instances, the objectors may be entering the case for the first time and lack familiarity with
the case. Although I know of no statistical survey of the number of successful objections, the
impression from reading the case law is that most class action settlements are approved. (Of
course, reported case law is not the proper basis for obtaining baseline data.) If my impres-
sion of the difficulty of upsetting a class action consent proposal is shared by the bar, then
the incentives to enter the fray may be reduced. See also Note, Participation and Depart-
ment of Justice School Desegregation Consent Decrees, 95 Yale L.J. 1811 (1986) (school
cases settled without involvement of students or parents).
18' See, for example, Finney v. Mabry, 458 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Ark. 1978) (consent de-
cree in Arkansas prison case presented after years of litigation). See generally Special Pro-
ject: The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 784, 809-
12 (1978).
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with incentives to hammer out careful agreements or to challenge
them, and an information base enhanced by the level of activity
within a given case.
Were we to want to import the quasi-adjudicatory function of
judicial approval of class action consent decrees to other cases, we
could find instances in which, even in the absence of class certifica-
tion, aspects of class litigation are present. For example, many
cases involve aggregations of interests, such as corporations, mu-
nicipalities, unions, agencies, or the government. The Supreme
Court has not required those actions to be certified as class ac-
tions,187 but some of the concerns that animate court involvement
in the class action consent decree are nonetheless present-as is
the possibility of dissidents seeking to participate.8 8 Given that
not all members of an aggregate such as a municipality might agree
about the wisdom of a consent decree, such cases could provide the
adversarial context in which a court might judge the adequacy of
representation or of the proposed outcome itself. 18 9
Of course, this suggestion assumes the utility of judicial super-
vision of the quality of representation in cases in which diverse
interests are merged into the concept of "plaintiff" or "defendant."
The opposite assumption-judicial reticence to interfere with a
preexisting aggregate-has recently been espoused by the Supreme
Court, which declined the Secretary of Labor's proposal that, prior
to recognizing the standing of a union, the Court determine the
adequacy of the representation.' 0 Thus, building on the model of
class actions to incorporate judicial inquiries into the adequacy of
187 See, for example, International Union, United Auto. v. Brock, 106 S. Ct. 2523, 2528
(1986) ("UAW v. Brock"); General Telephone Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318 (1980).
188 See, for example, County of Orange v. Air California, 799 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied sub nom. City of Irvine v. Orange County, 107 S. Ct. 1605 (1987) (denying
Irvine's attempt to intervene prior to entry of a consent judgment between Orange County
citizens' groups and Newport Beach).
"I See, for example, Donovan v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170, 1176 (7th Cir. 1985). I am not
suggesting that judges would be interested in creating further opportunities for adjudica-
tion, but rather that, if desired, the necessary predicates for adjudication might be available
in these cases. On the other hand, some courts view the government as a litigant deserving
of special deference and as rarely tempted to behave in a manner incompatible with the
interests purportedly represented. See United States v. City of Miami, Fla., 614 F.2d 1322,
1332 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd in part on unrelated grounds, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981) (en
banc).
"' UAW v. Brock, 106 S. Ct. at 2528-29. The potential for intrusion on the affairs of
such preexisting groups evidently gave the Court pause. If the judicial inquiry sketched in
the text were in place, groups might be reluctant to litigate-a position that some would
greet with dismay. The majority's solution to the potential inadequacy of the representation
was to suggest that, if a judgment were subsequently challenged, due process principles
would permit an inquiry at that point on the adequacy of representation. Id. at 2533.
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representation in all kinds of group litigation brings with it a risk
of intrusion into group affairs beyond the courthouse and the
threat of limiting access of groups to court.191
Aside from cases involving aggregations, the prospects for ad-
judication of consent decrees seem slight. In a bi-polar action in
which both parties and their counsel urge the entry of the consent
decree and neither lawyer anticipates returning to the court for at-
torneys' fee awards, 92 there is little reason to assume that a sub-
stantial judicial inquiry into the propriety of the entry of the de-
cree will either be sought or provided. 193 Rather, the guilty plea
ritual is more likely to provide a model for much of the docket.
C. Negotiating and Approving Consent Decrees
Before one endorses the current version of consent decree re-
view even in the context of class actions, it is necessary to explore
another aspect of the process: the role of the trial judge in formu-
lating the decree that is subsequently approved. Over the last dec-
ade, the federal judiciary has become increasingly enthusiastic
about settlement, and that enthusiasm has led some judges to
enter into the negotiation phase of all settlements, including those
that result in consent decrees.
Examples of this phenomenon are legion. One highly visible
instance was the attempt of Judge John Keenan, of the Southern
District of New York, to help the parties negotiate a settlement in
the Bhopal litigation. Unable to generate a settlement acceptable
to all, the district judge dismissed the lawsuit on the grounds that
the United States was an inappropriate forum. e4 A second illustra-
tion involves Judge Jack Weinstein, of the Eastern District of New
19' Fed. Rule Civil Proc. 23.2 permits some of this intrusion but only when "unincorpo-
rated associations" bring suit or are sued "as a class." The Rule's purpose, apparently, was
to enhance, not to diminish, the capacity of such associations to bring suit. Gravenstein v.
Campion, 96 F.R.D. 137; 140 (D. Alaska 1982).
92 In some jurisdictions, court appointed criminal defense lawyers return for fee
awards. However, many awards are based on preestablished (and relatively low-paying)
schedules, and some have fee caps-thus not creating the same incentives for lawyers. See
generally, Robert L. Spangenberg, Beverly Lee, Michael Battaglia, Patricia Smith and A.
David Davis, National Criminal Defense Systems Study (U.S. Department of Justice, Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics, Sept. 1986).
193 One possibility would be to relax standing requirements and to permit anyone to
challenge a consent decree. Providing notice to the relevant world might, however, be prob-
lematic and, presumably, attorneys' fee incentives would have to be added as well.
19' Bhopal presents an example of a case in which a judge attempted to settle-perhaps
by virtue of a consent decree-a case over which he subsequently decided he had no juris-
diction. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
modified, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. filed, No. 86-1860, 55 U.S.L.W. 3810 (1987).
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York, who played a major role in the settlement of the Agent Or-
ange litigation and who thereafter presided at the Rule 23(e) "fair-
ness" hearings.195
The problem is whether a judge who helps shape a proposed
consent decree can fairly adjudicate either the adequacy of the
representation or the adequacy of the compromise itself. The diffi-
culty of judicial involvement is illustrated by a case that involved
neither a class action nor a consent decree. In Edwards v. Born,1 98
the district judge reported that he followed his "standard" proce-
dure of conducting settlement negotiations.1 11 He spoke first to
lawyers for both sides, then with each attorney ex parte, and was
able to obtain consent to conclude the litigation by the payment of
money. Subsequently, the plaintiff challenged the attorney's au-
thority to enter into the settlement. The trial judge sought to hold
onto the agreement reached; he attempted to convince the plaintiff
of the adequacy of the settlement. Unsuccessful, he held a hearing
and determined that, because the lawyer had "apparent" authority
to settle, the settlement would be enforced.19
I doubt that the district judge in Born displayed aberrant be-
havior. He had invested time in obtaining the lawyers' willingness
to compromise; he may well have suggested the deal that was ulti-
mately struck, and he was eager to hold the parties to the agree-
ment made. How can we expect a judge who helps fashion a settle-
ment to be open to the possibility that the bargain made is not a
good one-or is simply not one a litigant wants? The conflict be-
tween settling a case and then assessing the adequacy of the settle-
ment seems so obvious as to make the frequency of the practice
surprising. Apparently, arguments about judicial economy (a judge
familiar with a case can evaluate more rapidly the settlement)
have, thus far, carried the day. 99
In re Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. 740. See generally Schuck, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. at
337 (cited in note 66), and Symposium: Mass Torts After Agent Orange, 52 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 329 et seq. (1986).
I9 608 F. Supp. 580 (D.V.I. 1985), vacated and remanded, 792 F.2d 387 (3d Cir. 1986).
,97 Id. at 582.
"9I Id. at 585. The district court was reversed and the case remanded for further evi-
dentiary development of the basis for defense attorney's understanding of the apparent au-
thority of plaintiff's counsel to settle the lawsuit. 792 F.2d 387.
"' For example, when affirming Judge Weinstein's approval of the consent judgment in
Agent Orange, the Second Circuit spent little time addressing the role Judge Weinstein
played in shaping the settlement. See In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation,
818 F.2d at 151, 155-56, 170. See also Huertas v. East River Corp., 813 F.2d 580, 582 (2d Cir.
1987) (reversing trial court's order of attorneys' fees after settlement but noting that "[o]n
remand, undoubtedly [the judge] will be able to bring his powers of persuasion to bear one
more time to assist the parties in agreeing ... ").
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In the meantime, we inhabit a world in which some judges
participate in negotiations and then preside to determine the fair-
ness of those settlements. If we had some view of a special role for
judges qua judges in the negotiation of settlements, we might con-
clude that their participation in the settlement negotiations brings
about better, fairer, more lawful, settlements. Whatever the quality
of the decision making at the subsequent hearing on the approval
of the settlement, we could commit resources to enforcement of
consent decrees negotiated by judges on the premise that those
contracts are truly distinct from those negotiated without judicial
participation. If we thought that judges had special insight or bet-
ter information than did the parties or their lawyers,"' then judges
might legitimate consent decrees by the very fact of helping to for-
mulate them. If adjudication is blended into the development of
the decree itself, then consent decrees would stand as a product of
judicial judgment.
The literature on how judges settle cases provides little basis
for the view that, when crafting settlements, judges engage in an
activity akin to adjudication. While a good deal of variation exists,
many stories from judges and commentators describe how judges
"split the difference" or make rough calculations to generate num-
bers for compensation. 201 Given their relatively meager information
base and the small amount of time judges reportedly have to work
on settlements of most cases,202 it would be difficult for them to do
much else. Judges are in the business of pressing litigants to com-
promise, not of assessing-based upon probing inquiries-the
quality of the bargains made. The fact of judicial involvement in
negotiations, in and of itself, provides no particular information
about the quality of the settlements reached.03
In sum, to the extent that we have a model for an adjudicatory
role for judges in the approval of class action consent decrees, that
model cannot readily be generalized to other parts of the docket.
200 See Schuck, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 348-49 (cited in note 66) (judicial involvement in
settlement enhances parties' information).
21 See Provine, Settlement Strategies (cited in note 65), and Sarokin, 38 Rutgers L.
Rev. at 434-35 (cited in note 66) (judges lack ability to predict jury verdicts but judges'
suggestions are nonetheless given great weight by the parties).
202 One federal district judge has estimated that, at best, he has one half hour to devote
per case on all pretrial matters. Letter from the Honorable Gerald Goettel of the Southern
District of New York (on file with the author).
203 But see Patricia M. Wald, Negotiation of Environmental Disputes: A New Role for
the Courts?, 10 Colum. J. of Envtl. L. 1, 32 (1985) ("judicial role in negotiating settlements
will not and should not be passive in important, complex cases .. ." with environmental law
issues).
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Further, that model is itself in jeopardy of becoming meaningless
as judges adjudicate the fairness of the agreements they them-
selves have created. Finally, even if judges were able to evaluate
the proposed settlements, frequent judicial disapproval would di-
minish one of the assumed advantages of negotiated settle-
ments-certainty of outcome.
D. The Quality of Judicial Action
One final return to my basic question. What do judges do
when entering consent decrees? Should judges do whatever it is
that they do, so that litigants may continue to obtain consent
decrees?
Of the variants described in the typology, Variant I, Party
Control, is one form that has superficial plausibility. Judges are
not asked to adjudicate on the basis of inadequate information
presented by disinterested, nonadversarial litigants. This mode is
one in which judges in fact only sign the consent decrees as re-
quested. No pretense of decision making is involved. The legiti-
macy of this practice hinges upon several factors. One is the practi-
cal impact of making such decrees available (i.e., do more
settlements result than would otherwise? Is compliance greater?).
However, given the current state of our information, the practical
impact cannot be ascertained. A second factor is the strength of
the autonomy-efficiency-flexibility arguments set forth above. An-
other possibility is that judges need not justify their actions by ad-
judication. In support of the no-need-to-justify approach, one
might analogize the "rubber stamp" entry of consent decrees to
the many "other things" that courts do, such as naturalization of
citizens or weddings.20 4 One might also find support for the prac-
tice in the current trend towards expansion of informal modes of
decision making in courts. Many argue for an increasingly diffuse
role for federal judges, now given tasks as "case managers" and as
advocates of alternative dispute resolution.0 5 Presumably, court
resources and power are not diluted (and indeed, may be en-
hanced) by the judiciary having multiple or blurred roles. Under
204 Murray L. Schwartz, The Other Things That Courts Do, 28 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 438,
447 (1981) (suggesting that such judicial activities be evaluated in terms of the burdens
imposed on courts and the potential threat to courts' moral authority and political power).
See also Emanuel B. Quint and Neil S. Hecht, 1 Jewish Jurisprudence 21-31 (1980) (the
"non-judicial" functions of the Great Sanhedrin).
"0' Peckham, 37 Rutgers L. Rev. at 267-77 (cited in note 65) (advocating judicial pro-
motion of alternative dispute resolution).
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this view, the fact that consent decrees are entered in the face of
uncertainty about law and fact and in the absence of deliberation
poses no bar to judicial action.
I have expressed my reservations about this vision of the fed-
eral judiciary. Keenly aware of the powers of the judiciary, I am
fearful of lawless and unconstrained roles.20 6 Judges wield public
power, and I worry about the use of that power. These concerns
have application to the consent decree process; judges may be us-
ing the consent decree process to avoid submitting their decisions
to public or appellate review. Judges may be enhancing their pow-
ers by obtaining party submission to that which judges could not
order. In addition, judges may be accomplices to the issuance of
court orders in derogation of legal rules.
The force of this criticism depends, in part, on the actual
practice in consent decrees, a world about which we have limited
information. What are the agreements made? How often do judges
take an active role in their formulation? How much judicial deci-
sion making is hidden? Further, one might respond by noting that
the consent decree process provides a modicum of openness in
some instances. If parties opt for private settlement in lieu of a
consent decree, we know little or nothing about the nature of their
accord, whereas when a consent decree is issued, we learn a bit.2 07
In contrast, of course, if adjudication were chosen instead of a con-
sent decree, we would learn more about the application of legal
rules to a particular set of facts.
Variant II, Party Control/Judicial Approval, has some claims
to conceptual plausibility, at least in the limited context of consent
decrees in class actions and perhaps in other cases involving aggre-
gations of competing interests. The presence of a number of inter-
ests may generate disputes about the propriety of a compromise
and are likely to provide sufficient information upon which to
make decisions resembling adjudication. To the extent that judg-
ment is desired as a predicate to consent decrees, then these cases
may be the occasions for judgment as well as action. At least,
judges can adjudicate whether legally adequate consent to an
agreement exists.
However, Variant II is a mode that appears to be dying even
206 Resnik, Failing Faith, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 494 (cited in note 107); Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374 (cited in note 76).
20 See Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association v. Hotel Rittenhouse
Associates, 800 F.2d 339, 344-46 (3d Cir. 1986) (papers filed in court in connection with a
settlement may not be sealed absent a particular showing of a need for secrecy).
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as its contours are being sketched. In its stead, Variant III, Judi-
cial Control, is becoming increasingly common. But, as judges ne-
gotiate the settlements that must then be approved, judges under-
mine their ability to judge. Judges become one more party agreeing
to the settlement rather than disinterested bystanders. Given the
structural incentives to approve settlements-the time, energy and
resources that will be required if adjudication is demanded-we
cannot expect judicial disapproval of many proposed agreements.
Bifurcation of the process (one judge to negotiate, a second to ap-
prove) is only a palliative, because deference to the first judge is
likely to be frequent.
CONCLUSION
Many instances of "judging consent" are oxymoronic. One
cannot have judgment without adjudication, and adjudication de-
pends upon conflict, rather than upon consent. Absent the adapta-
tion of some forms of continental procedure in which the court and
its staff (rather than the litigants) develop information, 0 8 judges
are ill-equipped to do much other than nod when the litigants join
together and seek court approval. Judges may (in a few limited
situations) be able to determine the fact of consent or the ade-
quacy of the bargaining process. We may, because of an assump-
tion that avoiding full adjudication is desirable and some openness
about settlements is valuable, encourage that activity and commit
societal resources as a result of it. However, judges cannot, absent
conflict, determine much about the legality or the quality of the
compromises made. Our resources may flow to support bargains
about which we know little.
Thus, claims for the continued availability of class action con-
sent decrees or of plea bargaining can be based only weakly upon
the coherence of a judicial role in ascertaining the adequacy of the
agreements made. The stronger arguments must come from a vi-
sion that one wants-without full adjudication-that which only a
court judgment enables: the distribution of funds to a class, a
change in conditions at a prison, the incarceration of an individual,
a priority in the court queue. Further, in civil cases in which no
class action has been certified, the judicial role provides virtually
no basis for validating consent decrees. The fact that a judge has
entered a decree tells us nothing. Rather, other explana-
tions-about compliance or ease of enforcement, about the capac-
208 Langbein, 52 U.Chi. L. Rev. at 823-26 (cited in note 76).
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ity of other institutions to perform recordation services, about the
desirability of generating some public information about accords
reached, about the values of autonomy, efficiency, and making
court judgments available less expensively, or about the utility of
court orders that do not clarify legal norms2 9-must be called
upon to justify using the symbolism of courts to christen the con-
tracts made. The utility and legitimacy of consent decrees must
come from explanations other than the quality of judicial involve-
ment with consent decrees at the time of their entry.
209 See, for example, Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1984).
